As the US Navy enters the era of unmanned operations and implements distributed maritime operations (DMO), small, light manned warships are needed to simplify this transition and fill the roles that require crews. Congress has expressed concerns about unmanned ships in many ways and emphasized the need for a class of ships to bridge the gap. The Light Manned Autonomous Combat Capability Program (LMACC) of the Naval Graduate School has designed a warship to meet this need.

The demand for these small, heavily armed warships has also been determined and is based on extensive analysis and wargames of the Naval Innovation Center. These ships will provide distributed frontier forces capable of conducting surface warfare and attacking missile bases in the weapon engagement zone of the hostile A2/AD system. They will be commanded by human tactical experts and operate with supporting unmanned ships (such as the Sea Hunter MDUSV) to allocate capabilities and minimize the impact of combat losses.

The purpose of our article is to publicly demonstrate the engineering dimensions of the LMACC plan. Since the United States has no small warships that can be used as a baseline, we must first determine what our requirements should be based on our unique needs. Fortunately, this can be achieved in a relatively simple way by extensively analyzing how foreign ships are designed to meet their national needs, and using this understanding to determine our own requirements. Therefore, we will first study the options faced by other countries, use it to formulate the core of the minimum requirements for US warships, examine the shortcomings compared with other budget plans, and finally discuss how to expand in an affordable way to achieve a set of capabilities that the Navy will be satisfied with. . Once we have determined our requirements and overall configuration, we will discuss our automation methods, staffing, operating concepts, future variants of special tasks, and current status.

(The scope of this article is intentionally limited to the engineering aspects of the LMACC program. Our procurement method will be discussed in the upcoming issue of Naval Engineers Magazine. Fleet and budget integration has been discussed in a previous article on the USNI blog, "Beyond the high and low : A deadly and affordable three-tier fleet.")

Due to our relative lack of domestic practical experience in the development of small warships, we will start with foreign designs to establish a transferable understanding of its capabilities, limitations, and design trade-offs. Because of the many types of ships used worldwide, it is impractical to discuss each example individually. Instead, we will discuss task areas and compromises in general, allowing readers to consider how to construct specific foreign designs to meet the needs of their country. Areas of design interest include anti-ship missiles, survivability, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and launch facilities. The first three subsections divide the discussion into large and small countries, while the last subsection is divided by the type of launch facility. Then each section finally discusses how this translates into the unique situation of the United States. This will lay the foundation for our subsequent discussion of the basic preliminary requirements for general-purpose small US warships.

Small warships are often labeled as "missile boats" or "frigates" based on their main anti-ship missile weapons and equipment, with little thoughtfulness. However, not all missiles are created equal. The choice of missile depends on the intended use of the platform.

Small countries trying to defend themselves with a limited budget (such as Norway) usually prioritize the lethality of high-performance missiles designed to sink large warships. However, because they often face the limitations of off-ship sensors, strategic depth, and force structure to absorb combat losses, they often sacrifice range and network capabilities to control missile cost and weight.

Large powers that prioritize coastal defense against more powerful opponents (such as the A2/AD systems of Russia and China) tend to see their small warships as part of a larger system. These ships are designed to complicate the enemy's targeting and defensive formations, as if they were to sink ships. As a result, they are more likely to invest in voyages and networks because they can reasonably expect to use it, but may be willing to save money by equipping these ships with cheaper, and therefore generally less lethal weapons.

Due to the highly networked and forward-deployed nature of the US Navy, we cannot accept these compromises and must arm our small warships with highly lethal long-range cyber weapons.

A major issue for all warships is survivability. One of the key differences between small warships is how they solve this problem. These small warships do not rely on large, expensive missile systems to destroy threats at a long distance, but mainly rely on avoiding attacks and are equipped with limited point defense weapons. This is achieved through a combination of small size, reduced signatures, electronic warfare and tactics.

It is important to remember that other countries often focus on pre-launch survivability rather than counterattacks based on missile characteristics. The lack of attention to post-launch survivability is usually based on the assumption that even if they lose the spacecraft, the exchange cost ratio will usually be in their favor. Another important consideration, especially for small countries, is that their ports are usually vulnerable to deadlocks, so surviving ships may not be able to rearm or refuel, so even if they do survive, they are actually unable to move. For large countries with complex A2/AD systems, protecting these ships is usually the main responsibility of other platforms, saving a lot of money by reducing costs related to survivability.

Smaller nations usually invest more in survivability and endurance to obtain extremely high speeds to increase their chances of entering the attacking position before sinking. They also usually use tactics to avoid pre-emptive strikes by using marine geography and integrating into commercial traffic, making their ships difficult to track in peacetime.

The United States can count on a safe port to rearm somewhere, even if it needs to withdraw all the way back to the United States, so we need to further emphasize evasion, because even after launching missiles, these ships must persist in the hostile A2/AD network This means that a small American warship must use stealth cyber missiles capable of flying deceptive routes to cover the launch site, as well as the best electronic warfare equipment we can afford, passive sensors, and reduced acoustic features. The reduction of other forms of signatures is an interesting issue, because if the signature of a warship is significantly different from the signatures around it, there is a risk of standing out from civilian traffic. After all, China's maritime patrol aircraft can easily recognize that a "buoy" transiting the high seas is actually a small warship. On the other hand, we don’t need the high speeds favored by many foreign countries, especially because the integration of slow-moving civilian traffic will be a key aspect of survivability. Therefore, we should trade speed for voyage to control costs and project electricity from our generally safe but distant ports.

The last American-specific feature can greatly improve the survivability in the A2/AD network, reduce the voyage requirements, and reduce the logistical burden. It is to eliminate gas turbines and use diesel engines. This will allow these ships to call at any commercial port for diesel fuel and possibly food, while further enhancing the illusion that they are small commercial ships. With some imaginative leadership, this will provide almost unlimited theater scope and wandering time with minimal logistical support, simplify our operations and complicate the enemy's situation.

Although many small warships have anti-submarine capabilities, they are usually used as denial platforms in coastal areas, rather than ocean-going escorts or submarines. For countries worried about hostile submarines, such areas deny the necessary protection for ports and other coastal facilities, otherwise these facilities will be very fragile. In contrast, performing the latter's high-end mission requires large aviation facilities and expensive frigate or destroyer sonar.

Since we have a large nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet and remote areas of hostile submarine forces, we do not need a small surface ship to protect our ports from submarine attacks, so it is usually best to omit such anti-submarine warfare equipment. The United States only needs this ship to have a reasonable chance of surviving in the theater of a hostile submarine, and this can be provided most economically by reducing acoustic features and appropriate strategies. In fact, the active sonar systems used by other countries for area denial are harmful to US services because they will allow enemy submarines to detect the ship from farther away.

Many small warships include some form of launch facility for ships, helicopters, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and underwater vehicles (UUV).

Ship launch facilities are important for various maritime security operations and general utility tasks, including allowing access to unimproved coastlines. Because of this utility and its moderate space and weight impact, they are used on many small warships. It is also important to note that if various functions need to be performed, including acting as outboard sensors and decoys, ship launch facilities can often launch similarly sized USVs.

Although the usefulness of naval helicopters has been established, they are relatively uncommon on small warships. Adding a complete aviation facility requires a significant increase in ship size, crew and cost. Even a simple helipad used for vertical replenishment can have a significant impact on the superstructure. In addition, the helicopter is relatively visible, which makes it easier for opponents to distinguish warships from civilian traffic.

A more common way to provide air surveillance for small warships is small drones. Because they can be easily added to existing ships, they have become a common accessory for small military and coast guard ships worldwide. These aircraft provide many advantages of helicopters, have much lower characteristics, and have little or no impact on the design of ships. In addition, considering their proliferation in the civilian field, launching small drones is no longer a recognized military activity. It is reasonable to assume that all future designs will at least consider the operation of manually launching drones, and it is likely that many will also integrate launch systems for larger assets.

Although UUV launch facilities are currently relatively few outside of dedicated MCM platforms, the maturity of the technology makes it worthy of more general consideration. UUVs can perform a range of other tasks, including subsea search and interaction with submarine cables, without the need for specialized processing of the ship itself. In addition, the launch facility can also be used to transport additional MCM unmanned submarine vehicles for use by other ships. Therefore, since the launch facility is not particularly large, it seems likely that this capability will explode, although it is too early to determine how useful it is.

For the U.S. Navy, the only truly important launch capability is a small drone capable of over-the-horizon surveillance and targeting. Our persistence requirements mean that we almost certainly need some form of ship launch capability to support these missions. We may also need UUV emission capability, but it may not meet the minimum requirements.  

Minimum requirements for small U.S. warships

Based on the above discussion and some common practices, the following list provides a set of reasonable approximate minimum requirements for any small U.S. warship. Please note that this is not our final design, but a simplified explanation using current technology and standard design practices:

The assumption includes possible ship launch facilities, while the more tentative UUV launch facilities have been omitted. This voyage was chosen to allow ships to use internal fuel to attack from one island chain to the next and back (for example, Guam to the Philippines), and to use additional bladders and/or limited refueling. The speed is not accurate because small changes will not have a major impact, and no attempt is made to determine displacement or crew replenishment because it is not directly related to this example.

Although the above requirements are clearly different from any current designs, they should be the rough outlines of fairly traditional small warships tailored to meet the needs of the US Navy. Obviously more work needs to be done to refine it into a final set of requirements, but analyzing the comparison of this traditional design with other hypothetical budget priorities is close enough to show why we are not simply satisfied with this Minimum configuration.

In any discussion of hypothetical design, it is vital to keep in mind the key alternatives and refutations. In the case of small warships, the most relevant argument that may be made is that the aircraft can do the job better. This can take many forms of different strengths, but weaker forms of attack will spoil the discussion. Therefore, a hypothetical, specially manufactured, bomber-like anti-ship aircraft will be considered here. A comparison with the aircraft described in this section will be used to demonstrate the shortcomings of the aforementioned "sufficient" warship and discuss how to make it worthwhile.

This hypothetical aircraft will be a large stealth flying wing built using F-35 technology. By sharing logistics between this hypothetical anti-ship aircraft and the F-35, the use of these electronic devices can eliminate most of the cost of new development and simplify maintenance. In addition, the new low-maintenance stealth coating will eliminate the hassle of old designs like B-2, and the design will be further simplified because its task does not require extreme stealth. It only needs to be able to attack it before the enemy warship finds it. Considering the range of the LRASM and the sensor performance inherited from the F-35, this is not particularly challenging. Therefore, the cost should be relatively low.

For the sake of argument, suppose this aircraft costs 300 million U.S. dollars and carries 24 LRASMs, although there may be a better number. This is completely different from a small warship that costs a little less than US$100 million and carries 8 LRASMs. Therefore, the cost of each missile carried is roughly the same, and we can focus on other performance parameters.

The ship has three key advantages: durability, existence and wearability. The first two stem from the obvious fact that the cruise time of a ship is much longer than that of an airplane, which makes it more suitable for keeping weapons in place during wartime, or to demonstrate the United States by performing various low-end missions in peacetime. interest. The third reason is that we can afford three ships for the price of one plane, so the same amount of investment will provide more ships and reduce the cost of losing one ship, assuming the crew has recovered. Although attrition rate is a benefit in high-end warfare, in the current geopolitical environment, peacetime flexibility provided by enhanced persistence and presence is not so important. Finally, this ship may be able to provide some amphibious lifts for small US Marines operating under the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, although its inability to provide meaningful fire support will limit its usefulness if the island is disputed.

In contrast, the aircraft has many wartime advantages. The obvious speed advantage means that aircraft can respond to developing situations and re-arm faster than ships. This is further combined with its height, and despite their durability advantages, allows one aircraft to detect a wider area than three ships. In addition, the combination of its long detection range and stealth fuselage means that the aircraft is more likely to see it before seeing the enemy warship, providing a greater advantage over the ship in terms of survivability and first effective shooting. Finally, due to its F-35 architecture, the aircraft will be compatible with a wide range of standard regulations, such as AGM-158 JASSM, AIM-120 AMRAAM, AGM-88 HARM, GBU-39 SDB, etc., allowing it to perform other tasks.

It is clear from this comparison that those who decide which project to fund will not choose "enough" small warships, because other projects, such as the aforementioned aircraft, provide a higher return on investment. Obviously more capabilities are needed to make this ship valuable.

From feasible to valuable

The challenge to solve this problem is that it must be done without affecting the cost and size of these ships. In addition to the original Street Fighter concept, the addition of ideal functions led to an increase in the scale and cost of LCS. In order to adapt to the traditional concept of a frigate with the FFG(X) program, a ship with capabilities and expanded cost was subsequently added, close to that of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

In order to retain the advantages of a small warship and prevent it from growing into another Burke ship, there are two basic options: enhanced launch/support facilities and secondary weapon reconfiguration.

This section will explain how the LMACC program solves this problem and provide complete design details for our baseline configuration. We have made major improvements to our launch and support facilities to increase overall effectiveness, and have developed a detailed plan to provide maritime support to the USMC during distributed operations. For secondary weapons, we use the interaction between technologies to provide greater lethality to smaller surface threats and restore the ability to provide strong fire support to the marines on shore at a comparable cost.

Before delving into how this ship will integrate with the Marine Corps' EABO concept, we will briefly review the launch facilities discussed earlier. Although not required, UUV launch facilities have been included to provide additional flexibility at low cost and are designed to benefit from the stern launch ramp required to support EABO. In addition, due to small crew and wide beams, we can also install 11m RHIB to provide additional utility and transportation capacity. On the other hand, even for relatively small landing platforms, helicopter accommodation has a significant design impact, especially in terms of maintenance and support personnel, so it has been omitted in favor of the top drone locker.

Although the Marine Corps is correct to use dedicated transport aircraft to implement EABO, the surface combat fleet can also provide limited maritime support. The DDG-51 destroyer must provide this support on a non-interference basis, but our ship will become an integral part of the mission. The normal wartime use of these ships will see pair attack to the same disputed coastal area where the Marines intend to fight, so they will supplement the dedicated transport fleet by carrying light forces and supplies. LMACC has two empty six-person cabins, plus four extra beds in the crew cabin, so the tactical pair can easily carry a Marine platoon between them. The cabins will also provide space for contingents, one of which will be equipped with a brig to support peacetime patrols and partnership missions.

The other half of the marine support is to transport the boarding marines ashore. Features such as shallow draft, pump jet propulsion, and COTS navigation sonar will bring these ships very close to the coast to facilitate rapid transfers, which may even include swimming. The easy-to-access storage space at the front of the launch bay supports the rapid transfer of equipment and supports the use of inflatable combat rubber boats (CRRC), while the oversized lower cargo bay provides ample storage space. Finally, by combining a completely enclosed bay with a stern launch ramp to promote rapid deployment at sea, especially in bad weather or at night, the operation of the boat has been greatly enhanced.

It should also be noted that the attributes that make it very suitable for supporting the Marine Corps also make it very suitable for supporting special forces.

In terms of secondary weapons, we returned the overall configuration to the basic requirements: short-range boat defense, long-range boat defense, area-to-ground attack, precise ground-to-ground attack, and limited air defense. This allows us to rethink the ways to meet these requirements and use the interaction between modern weapon systems to achieve better results than traditional deck guns.

The key technology to realize our layout is the humble Javelin Launch Tray. This adds the Javelin missile launcher to the standard pivot-mounted weapon and allows the loader/gunner team to outperform the 30mm automatic cannon with a greater range and comparable engagement rate, while greatly reducing weight and installation costs. Although this is a useful supplementary defense for existing ships, a large number of devices make LMACC an excellent escort against the threat of small clusters, and more importantly, it fully meets the defense requirements of short-range boats without deck guns. At first glance, this may seem less important because these types of threats are usually related to Iran, but China has developed a small USV to perform similar tasks, making this threat relevant to high-end combat. The Javelin also provides limited air defense capabilities because it is designed to destroy helicopters and tanks.

Since there was no need for traditional deck guns worth millions of dollars, LMACC installed a 105mm howitzer instead. Unlike the larger separately loaded 155mm version, the shell ammunition of this weapon makes it suitable for maritime service. As a traditional towed artillery, it is a light, low-cost weapon, very suitable for ground attacks. This of course resolves long-standing concerns about naval artillery fire and is directly related to supporting the Marine Corps.

These two weapons fill the needs of short-range boat defense, area-to-ground attack, and limited air defense, leaving long-range boat defense and precision ground attack. The remaining two requirements are solved by adding Spike NLOS missiles. This allows small surface threats to be dealt with safely from the horizon, and allows the precise elimination of armored vehicles and other point targets. This is complemented by the howitzer and javelin to provide excellent anti-ship capabilities and strong fire support for the marines on the shore.

The last weapon system is the Micro Hit Kill (MHTK) missile, which can provide additional defense against low-end air threats such as small drones and rockets. This further improves the survivability, especially against the threats that swarm, and ensures that the air defense capabilities of the deck guns are fully replicated.

The result is a more flexible and lethal weapon with relatively low installation weight and cost. This makes our weapons and equipment significantly better than the traditional automatic cannon configuration that has not had a significant design increase before, and even provides major advantages over larger deck guns.

Now that we have understood the requirements and logic of our design, we will take a moment to provide a design summary of our baseline configuration:

This maintains the previously established minimum requirements while integrating the additional functions discussed.

In retrospect and compared with hypothetical anti-ship aircraft, these low-cost improvements add many advantages over the "full" design. In addition to the previous advantages of durability, presence, and abradability, it can now operate UUVs, transport the Marine Corps, provide surface fire support, and destroy small boat groups. This makes the ship a more useful platform that can flexibly adapt to an uncertain future and provides a good reason for procurement officials to choose it over an aircraft. This clear practicality and economic feasibility is a sign of a well-thought-out request, and in our opinion, makes this design suitable for American services.

It should be remembered that this information only applies to the baseline configuration. Other variants add a 10-foot hull section to increase special mission capabilities, so the cost will increase.

From a system perspective, the core concept of this ship is that it will be built like a large USV. Since the automated system can notify the crew when action is required, traditional watches are unnecessary and can significantly reduce the crew. In addition, since the marine system will be designed to operate with minimal intervention as expected by the USV, it theoretically requires little maintenance. However, unlike a full USV, someone will be present to correct any problems that do occur. Therefore, from a system perspective, this will enable LMACC to bridge the gap with autonomy because it allows people to work on ships while operating like autonomous ships. Therefore, the fleet of these ships will allow us to safely build a large amount of operational knowledge and provide information for our future USV and human-machine collaboration.

We plan to use a 15-person crew led by a War Tactics Instructor (WTI) to manage these ships. These tactical experts will be very suitable to lead their ships and accompanying unmanned ships to victory in the most challenging situations, and take the initiative when they are interrupted with external command. They will set traps, strike targets on the shore and hunt down enemy warships, while disrupting the enemy's response capabilities by disappearing into civilian traffic.

Although our work shows that 15 crew members are suitable for managing weapons, sensors, and drones, we are keenly aware of the uncertainties associated with this novel staffing concept and the need to increase personnel for special tasks. Therefore, the ship is designed with five or six-person cabins, plus a single-person cabin for the commander to provide sufficient berthing space. Two of the cabins are theoretically intended for non-crew use, such as the Marine Corps, Coast Guard law enforcement unit or brig space for EABO deployment. This left free beds for the other four crew members and did not have any meaningful impact. If necessary, one or two cabins can be used to further expand the crew. Even in the worst case, the 31 beds can accommodate 3 more crew members than the existing Cyclone-class patrol ship, and there will be no heat racks. By allowing ships to comfortably carry traditional complete supplements when needed, this effectively eliminates the risks associated with smaller crews.

These ships are designed to fight to defend or retake the island chain. The design emphasizes fighting in a complex environment by disappearing into civilian traffic and coastal chaos. These ships will rely on passive sensors to complicate the enemy's target recognition problem and maximize the chances of achieving tactical surprise attacks. The basic wartime combat unit will be a pair of tactical units, consisting of two basic short-hull ships or a basic design and a dedicated variant. These pairs will work closely with unmanned ships and marines on shore to prevent enemy entry into the area, weaken enemy defenses, and clear the way for heavier troops. They will also provide light maritime and logistical support to the small, well-equipped Marine Corps. Please note that although we have done a lot of work on tactics, deployment strategies, and cooperation with the existing Leviathan Navy, most of the materials are not publicly available and will not be discussed further here. In other words, most of the content is based on the work of our colleague, the late Captain Wayne Hughes (Wayne Hughes), so the public who are interested in learning more are encouraged to read his work.

In peacetime, these ships will provide cost-effective assets for patrols, partnerships, and deterrence missions. Since these ships are even much cheaper than frigates, they will become a better choice for combating piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and other illegal activities, allowing more expensive ships to focus on tasks and training to fully utilize their capabilities. They will also conduct more effective joint training with our small partners whose fleets are closely matched with these ships. This is particularly important in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, where it is necessary to carry foreign maritime police units for joint patrols and visit many small primitive ports to appease our friends and deter China. This will also help train young officers by reducing the workload of high-end assets and providing early command cabins, thereby greatly improving the combat readiness and performance of our fleet.

Finally, the operational similarity between this PCG and Cyclone-class PCs greatly simplifies fleet integration. LMACC can replace Cyclone at a similar cost, so there is no operational risk. We can hand over one of the ships to the fleet today, and they will be able to put it into service immediately, treating it as a hurricane, while the Surface Development Squadron improves the more advanced tactics developed by the Naval Graduate School. This makes it possible to immediately jump to mass production when needed, although building the prototype first reduces the risk, but delays its commissioning.

We have plans for several variants of special missions. In keeping with the navy’s historical tradition of naming boats after birds, they were all given bird names. The baseline variant of LMACC, the Shrike, has been discussed, and the other two variants have been enriched, the anti-aircraft Falcon and the anti-submarine Osprey, both of which have added new capabilities, and the hull has been lengthened by 10 feet.

It is difficult to discuss the details of the Falcon’s operations publicly, but it adds a new sensor and a tactical-length Mk 41 VLS module to destroy the enemy maritime patrol aircraft before it can be distinguished from civilian traffic. This will protect these ships from the greatest threat from enemy aircraft and significantly improve their combat capabilities in hostile A2/AD systems.

On the other hand, the Osprey variant is relatively simple and is designed to maximize the impact of the USV's installed sensors. The main addition is eight new inclined launch units for Tomahawk cruise missiles, modified to carry light torpedoes. This allows a very small number of these ships to greatly improve our ability to deter and defeat submarines, because they can quickly strike targets that are detected by outboard sensors hundreds of miles away. In addition, since the Tomahawk is a mature weapon deployed across the fleet, this will allow us to add this capability to our surface combat fleet and provide a way to recover outdated Tomahawks when we inevitably switch to other weapons. . Finally, the variant is completed by a passive sonar mounted on the hull and four fixed torpedo tubes for self-defense, as it is expected to operate in areas where the submarine risk is higher.

Two additional variants have been considered. The first is the UAV mothership, which adds a UUV processing module to deploy a large number of UUVs, and may also modify the launch module to carry two ships or USVs. The second is a variant of the Coast Guard, which replaced most of the missiles with dedicated wards, brigs, and safe contraband warehouses, turning them into a larger and more powerful version of the Sentry-class cutter, despite these The function can also be added to the hull part if the export customer wants to keep the missile.

Our requirements and top-level projects are complete. The only main task left is to complete our ship type, and we can do it while choosing shipyards and suppliers. Almost all the technologies we have chosen are already in use. The remaining technologies are closely based on deployed systems, and if the delay forces them to be deployed before these technologies are ready, the baseline shrike will still be combative. Since the Naval Graduate School is outside the traditional shipbuilding bureaucracy, we have great flexibility on the road to production. We can do anything, from traditional procurement to building it under the umbrella of all research projects outside of the existing procurement structure, just like TACPOD does, so we can take whatever approach is most acceptable to Congress and the Navy.

Mr. DiDonato is a volunteer member of the LMACC team funded by the NRP led by Dr. Shelley Gallup. He initially worked with the Naval Graduate School to create weapons for the baseline Shrike variant of LMACC, and previously served as a contract engineer for Lockheed Martin missile and fire control. He provides systems and mechanical engineering support to organizations throughout the defense industry, from the US Army Communications Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC) to Spirit Aerosystems, and conducts projects for all branches of the armed forces.

Featured image: LMACC design screenshot provided by Ben DiDonato

Excellent article-one of the best articles I have read. In the DMO environment, the need for refueling and rearming will be the most important. You need to discuss how to achieve this in a follow-up article. I also assume that the availability of these new ships must be very high? Finally, I want to point out that in a DMO environment, you will need more Lilly pad landing sites for the survivability of manned and unmanned vehicles.

Thank you, I will take a moment to answer your questions here.

Come on: I mentioned this briefly at the end of the survivability section, but our goal is to be able to use civilian infrastructure. Every commercial port in the world sells diesel fuel, so if the leadership agrees with this idea, we can refuel at any of them. Apart from that, all other refueling concepts are applicable, and our remote will also help simplify this problem.

Rearm: This is more challenging because LRASM is a beast in weapons. Ideally, loading and unloading equipment will be provided at sea or EABO outposts so that we can re-arm forward, but if not, we can always withdraw to the established ports, which may be Pearl Harbor or Guam. The rest of the ammunition is portable, so we can drag it out like other bulk items.

Availability: You are right, we are designing for high availability. Minimizing maintenance and failure is a major design goal, it will provide high availability and reduce operating costs.

Landing point: Our overall goal is to stay at sea as much as possible in the hostile A2/AD system, but it is limited to this. In other words, in addition to the established bases and the aforementioned commercial ports, you are talking about EABO facilities. You should really ask the Marine Corps.

Thanks again, if you want to clarify something further, please feel free to ask questions.

Most of the use of this craft will be done in peacetime rather than in battle. With 99% of the U.S. Navy ships engaged in competitive daily operations during their careers, what did these light manned ships do? The initial number of LCS crew members was too small. In order to ensure normal operation, rest and basic maintenance, shore-based personnel could not be completed, and it has been expanded to nearly 90 people. The PC-1 level requires 29 crew members to operate even modest weapons, sensors, ships, and engineering/support. This light surface ship seems to be overmaned and insufficiently equipped to conduct effective competitive regional operations, which is most of the work done by the deployment of the navy. How will the author respond to this criticism? thanks

The overall plan is to dispatch detachments to meet specific needs. For example, if we were to send one of the ships to patrol the Gulf of Mexico, we would bring a USCG law enforcement team to lead the VBSS mission and operate it like the PC-1 class today. The similarities of these daily patrols are more applicable, so you can get a good understanding of the daily operations in a given area by looking at the current operations of the Navy and Coast Guard of similar size. As I pointed out in the article, our ships meet or exceed Cyclone's capabilities at a similar cost, so we can engage in the mission as soon as the ship is put into service.

Regarding the issue of staffing, this is something we have considered and planned. As I pointed out in the article, this ship has 31 beds, so if we need to, we can easily bring more crew. The number of crew members may also change based on experience, and the contingent model is also suitable for this, because we may bring experts on board to improve the efficiency of auxiliary weapons for certain tasks.

The last thing to note is that the separation model is very suitable for partnerships and gray area competition. For example, we can send the Indonesian Coast Guard to combat China’s illegal fishing activities in its waters. This joint force will be in an excellent position to counter China, because the Indonesian Coast Guard detachment provides full legal power, while the US warship provides diplomatic cover and hard power to prevent China from forcibly solving the problem. Although we can certainly provide this combination for existing ships, they are too expensive to complete the job on a regular basis. On the other hand, LMACC is small enough that we have the ability to semi-permanently establish some bases in Indonesia to provide a lasting presence and continued resistance to China.

thank you for your reply. The 31 crew members are still a fairly small number for independent operations on ships of the proposed LMACC size and capability. If the Littoral Combat Ship faces challenges in a battle with nearly 90 crew members, how will LMACC handle a little more than one-third of them? It is true that no cockpit can save personnel, but even the basic maintenance and operations proposed in LMACC can easily consume 31 crew members. Naval culture plays an important role in what services can and cannot support. It often appears on paper that small boat crews can operate naval ships, but in fact, the culture of large ships with more crews (such as DDG 51) is suitable for smaller ships. Unless culturally supported, sailors are not used to being required to perform multiple tasks at the same time and perform the various roles required on small ships. I found that as a PC-1 sailor, I was trying to adapt the big ship sailor to the boat mentality. I did an MCM homework, the problem is not so serious, but it is still a problem. In the DDG-based surface navy, little is known about the working principles of small ships. The experience of the Littoral Combat Ship crew may change this, but the navy leadership still does not exist.

As a PC-1 class sailor, you are very suitable to answer many of these questions yourself, because I think this ship is our next-generation PC. If you look at the list of capabilities, you will notice that I mentioned the PCG name, and I also emphasized the ability to inherit that legacy in the last paragraph of the CONOPS section. The challenges you highlighted will obviously never go away, but as you pointed out, they are very familiar, which makes them more acceptable. Ideally, this will also be addressed by a larger future PCG fleet to change the overall culture of the Navy, but the number of people required to operate something like an aircraft carrier means that they will always have a great cultural weight.

Returning to the number of occupants, compared with Cyclone's 28, 31 seems to be more than enough. Keep in mind that most of the extra displacement is dedicated to fuel that triples the range, not the system, and there are many design decisions even in the absence of automation, such as the use of electric propulsion will greatly reduce maintenance requirements. Once you start automating ship functions, such as navigation and let the computer tell you when maintenance is needed, the workload and the number of crew will drop rapidly. Only experience can prove that the weather 15 is the correct number, but I am sure 31 is too much.

I also want to bring it up. The most basic missile boats for me are Houbei 22 with 12 people for 14 days and Skjold 21 for 8 days. Both have 168 man-day endurance. I might suggest that when these ships go to sea with the fleet for a while, the crew exchange might be good. Given that there is no helicopter operation, I would say that the limit will be based on a capacity of 7m RHIB at 18 locations or 11m at 26 locations. I chose 26 only because there is not much reduction in the battleship. The youngest real submarine crew is only 21 years old, and they only need to worry about a weapon system. Obviously, automation will continue to improve things, but I don't think you will bet on it. Happy when it appears and integrates it.

I tried to reply to this comment, but I didn't see it. At the risk of redundancy, I think you missed a key point. This is through autonomous human-machine collaboration. None of these were used in the design of PC-1. It did not exist at that time. We are using Sea Hunter's abilities to take care of ourselves, navigate and leave tactics to the crew. Autonomy cannot be tactics in a constantly changing environment. The mission of these ships in peacetime is to "package" and cooperate with the "Sea Hunter" version of fully unmanned ships, which has a deterrent effect. This is because it is learned that it is possible to strike a long-range surface-to-surface missile stationed on a man-made island on the shore for the first time. The size of the crew is suitable for the task and the ability to manage mainly automated weapon systems.

Activate security forces to ensure the safety of SPOD, anti-piracy, VBSS, river mothership and SPECWAR operations

You are using a blue water mentality, which is not wrong, but as a brown water sailor, these are very useful for the TOC of motherships, firepower and rivers, SWIC, SEALs, and other special operations operations.

But I will 200% agree, the blue water navy needs the most attention, brown water can be solved with 550 ropes and zippers! !

Wow, there is too much to talk about. I think the current size is suitable for a small manned platform. I have been landing around 206-225 feet. – LRASM is the correct choice for ASM. Use drones to find targets. I want something about Northrop Grumman BAT or Arcturus Jump 20. Really, I prefer 8 ADL launch units so that the same ship can be more easily equipped between anti-ship, submarine or AAW missions. – 105 mm. I would of course prefer a ship with a turret system. General Dynamics developed an LAV III turret with a Denel 105mm turret. It uses a separate fee, but has an automatic magazine. – ASW Tomahawk. Yes! Not sure about light torpedoes. I envision TLAM-D as a loitering ammunition. Stick a MAD detector inside. The concept of using submunitions, except for launching one sonar buoy at a time and leaving some as depth charges. – If you want to reduce emissions, why use Searam? Why not just an 11-21 RAM transmitter and figure out how to use a photoelectric system for positioning. A new IR pod similar to the F-15 connected to the AIM-9X? -Range and speed: I think this design is still an extension. MUSV and Overlord seem to have benchmark targets here. 4500@16 and 4500@19, the maximum speed is 27 knots and 28 knots respectively. Price (all in 2020 U.S. dollars): Before the equipment was added, only this ship had the cheapest MUSV of 30.8 million copies. The length of the 50m composite yacht and global response cutter after cyclone adjustment is less than 50m, and the length of the last quick response cutter is 65-70 million. The cheapest Ambassador III is 287 million, and 4’s program cost is really 407 million, so this is definitely not the way to go. The good news is that the B-21 will not carry 24 LRASM and cost more than 600 million, so I will not worry about defeating it. A better comparison is the P-8 between 187-231 million. My guess is that we will have a real winner (near Baynunah) with 165 million copies. Remember, in 2020 dollars, Visby is 312 and Skjold is 225.

Thanks for your wonderful comments. I will calculate your score in the order you put forward it.

– Your idea of ​​drones is very good. Of course it is worth considering. There are several other options, but we must remember that the relatively long service life of any ship means that the drones carried will almost certainly change at least once. In addition, although drone targeting is possible, the data link may reveal the location of the ship, so it may not be feasible in high-end combat. In other words, the advantage of drones in peacetime is huge, so even if it never finds a weapon, it is worthy of its weight.

– ADL is a good system and a strong competitor for the Osprey launch unit, but I am not sure if it is compatible with LRASM. I don't like to discuss this in detail because it may leak proprietary data, but you may be able to make some inferences from publicly released materials, especially the VLS profile model.

– I understand why you want a howitzer turret, but you have to consider the cost/benefit equation here. That gun will not be of much use, so I am very reluctant to spend more money on it. Basically simple, a fully manual gun should cost about $200,000, but moving it into the turret will add at least a million, possibly more, and will also greatly increase maintenance requirements. This is great for a dedicated gun platform like the LAV III self-propelled howitzer, but I don’t think it’s worth it for LMACC.

– For ASW Tomahawk, this is a very interesting idea. I think torpedoes are still essential because this is by far the best way to really kill the submarine, but replacing some of the fuel with MAD may be a good idea for future upgrades. In other words, the idea you are talking about does not really make sense, because putting these sensors on a dedicated platform, using them to cover the area, and then sending the tomahawk after they lock the target, the actual operation is much more. In short, this is our participation model, which is flexible enough to be used with any sensor platform including traditional manned assets.

– You have a good point of view on SeaRAM emissions, but the basic issue is reaction time. It can take a long time to obtain a positive target recognition and shooting solution using purely optical sensors, especially because it is difficult to determine the proximity rate of something coming. We solved this problem by handing over the optical inspection to SeaRAM for classification and prosecution. This keeps SeaRAM on standby until it is necessary to avoid launches, while still giving us the advantage of its fire control radar during actual engagements.

– Shelley and I discussed the range extensively. 7,500 is a rigid minimum requirement. Only by adding additional fuel bladder can it reach the possibility of reaching 10,000. We need to attack from Hawaii to the Philippines, and then without refueling Next return. This actually drove a significant increase in the displacement of the original 450-ton concept, and the Cyclone's 2500 nmi range was originally assembled with Lockheed. This does raise concerns for USVs, but they may be able to increase the range by reducing the cruising speed to 12 knots.

– On the other hand, in my conversation with the late Wayne Hughes, I determined the speed very early. Since it is located on the upper edge of patrol and the lower edge of attack, it provides an ideal compromise between the needs of patrol and attack missions. It is not much more than the USV you pointed out, and it is much less than Cyclone or foreign designs, so I very much doubt that this will be a problem.

– Regarding the cost, I am confident about the estimate of US$96.6 million. When we removed SeaRAM and AN/SLQ-32, the Coast Guard version dropped to about 80 million US dollars, which makes the actual difference between it and the cutting machine approximately 5 million US dollars plus optics (the Coast Guard will Like and may be added to other ships). The reason why we are far below the other warships you mentioned is because we avoid the cost of military radar, sonar, high speed, extreme stealth, expensive guns and small fleets. Although it will obviously cost more to fill the missile magazine.

– Regarding the comparison of aircraft, the point is that it is not a bomber, although if the Navy really tries to build it, the Air Force will undoubtedly object loudly. This is actually a variant of the stealth tanker/multipurpose aircraft concept. I have sought cost-competitive conversions with Boeing’s passenger aircraft for a while. Of course, this makes it very similar to the P-8 you mentioned, except that it is concealed enough to not be shot down hundreds of miles away.

This article is like that, but since you added more content in another comment, I will also fold it here.

-I like your idea of ​​having a crew exchange on site. I'm not sure how this will work, or whether we will do it at sea or in port, but it is definitely worth considering for longer missions. In other words, if we conduct short-distance patrols in the Strait of Hormuz like Bahrain does, it might make more sense to go home and change crew every week or two, because it is just around the symbolic corner.

– Regarding the ship, this is an 11m RHIB, so it can easily carry the entire crew and should be able to accommodate a detachment and ferry pilots.

I disagree with many of the ideas presented here, but one statement immediately made me doubt everything else.

"We intend to use a 15-person crew led by a War Tactics Instructor (WTI) to manage these ships."

WTI is not the only tactical expert in the Navy, or even the source of all tactical excellence in the fleet.

SMWDC’s mission statement is to improve the lethality and tactical proficiency of surface forces in all areas. This is achieved through efforts in four areas: advanced tactical training, doctrine and tactical guidance development, combat support, capability evaluation, experimentation, and future requirements.

WTI is the instructor, bringing the latest tactical ideas into the fleet and training fighters to win high-end battles. The WTI on board plays this role directly on the deck, making their crew full of enthusiasm, confidence and ability, not only to fight and win, but also to continuously learn and innovate at the pace of modern warfare or higher at work.

WTI is not more qualified to command or fight warships in battle than any other sailor. Without the insight and critical feedback of the sailors who perform daily tasks, we will not be able to accomplish what we do.

This article and possible entire design concept shows an unfortunate lack of understanding of naval culture and organization.

I agree with Casey. I personally spent a lot of time and energy to formulate the requirements for Burke-class destroyers. I also spent some time in OPNAV in the Surface Warface office. Through the Naval War College courses, one can gain insight into the effort required to understand all the things that must be considered to deploy an effective system. In my opinion, the same considerations discussed in this article are similar to those of starting the LCS level. (Note that the first 6 ships of the LCS class will soon be decommissioned because of various defects, including useful in fleet operations. After 6 years of service in the fleet.) Now because of 20 years and a lot of waste of money, we are behind the world. Development of modern frigate design. If there is no real opportunity for an independent team to clean up the ideas presented in this article, please do not make progress in this work. There are many "what if" questions that need to be resolved. Using lessons learned and other analysis to solve future demand forecasts by Bob Donnelly

I would be happy to discuss the hardware requirements in depth with you. Please feel free to post any specific questions or concerns you have, and I will be happy to answer them for you. Please remember that I am a hardware person, so I will leave the details of staffing and culture to Shelley, because this is his field of expertise. I let him take the lead there and make sure that if something goes wrong, as they did on the LCS, there is enough space for more crew members.

If the past week or years has taught us anything, it is that the Navy needs to do something different in its culture and organization. Large numbers are still correct, but making more useful ships or anything cheap, small and useful is not in the current culture or organization.

In peacetime, this is a deterrent. It is necessary to understand that the enemy's long-range surface-to-surface missile has a pre-emptive capability within the range. As for staffing, you did not seize the autonomy. Sea Hunter is now fully able to go to sea and comply with COLREGS. LMACC is not overcrowded when doing what humans do best-explaining the context. There is currently no software that can do this. This is why I call it a bridge ship. For some time to come, we will not install weapons on autonomous ships. Autonomy can be applied to weapon systems, under supervision, such as LMACC. My argument is that such supervision cannot rely on communication. It needs to be on board. You have also undertaken a battle that is not the ship’s mission. Its task is to allow the missile to enter the first island chain and become a potential preemptive ability. It is not roaming at sea to find a target in the traditional SAG V SAG battle.

The land-based M119 105mm gun has 7 crew members. Now the navy base may not need so many, but still need at least 3-5.

Another more "off the shelf" option is the 120 mm Nemo and AMOS turret mortar. They have a short range (10 kilometers), but are in service worldwide and are considered for use by the U.S. Army. They are studying ammunition that may extend the range to 20 kilometers.

Any turret system will significantly increase the cost of the ship, usually at least one million US dollars. This does not make economic sense in this app, because the howitzer is a low priority weapon for this ship.

For mortars, the reduction in range is a serious problem. Even with the use of a longer range 5-inch artillery, the danger of bringing ships closer to the coast to provide fire support is a long-standing problem, so when the 105mm howitzer can range more than 30 kilometers, I am very reluctant to accept this compromise.

Finally, the goal is to allow the crew to move to any system that needs to be operated at any given time. Therefore, we will not have dedicated gunners, but will pull people when we need to use a gun. This may result in a decrease in the efficiency of the battery, but if the mission requires heavy use of guns, you can always choose to bring experts on the plane.

I think it will be difficult for you to train such a small crew to properly maintain and operate so many manual weapon systems. M119, HMG/AGL, Javelin, Spike NLOS, and even SeaRAM, although it runs largely automatically, it requires maintenance. Each of these systems has specialized experts in other situations. Now, in addition to their "day-to-day work", you may be able to cross-train someone on HMG and Javelin, but I doubt you can effectively do more cross-training.

Consider replacing some HMG stents with stable Mk49 ROSAM remote stents. These can be continuously monitored and managed through the console on the bridge. It is based on Typhoon RWS, which can add a pair of spiked LR missiles. Not sure how long it will take to integrate Javelin. The Army’s M153 Protector RWS used on Strykers can optionally add a javelin.

I'm not sure how your Javelin Launcher Tray works, but another cheaper option is to carry some Javelin CLUs and let the tour team move between Javelin magazines as needed. This way you don't need to pay 7 CLUs. You only need to buy one for each team.

Although your concerns about training are valid, most of these systems are not difficult to use. After a few minutes of "training", I personally "fired" the javelin trainer, and after the same briefing, I saw dozens of different office workers successfully engage the target without fail. I don’t think there will be any problem with having all the crew go through the basic training of all systems, and because of the fun of simulated battles and limited entertainment, I expect that most of the crew will take the initiative to become missile experts.

Artillery is obviously another matter, but the training of M2/AGL is very mature, and I am willing to accept the limited efficiency of howitzers, so I don't think this is a big problem.

The real concern is maintenance. Most of these weapons do not require much care, and the ship’s systems are designed to operate for long periods of time without maintenance, but the ocean is a ruthless environment. I am quite confident that the staff will be able to keep their work going through a combination of training, manuals and calling domestic experts’ services, but as part of the bridge to autonomy is to find out which methods are not in line with our ideas, it will and overcome the orders. Unpleasant accidents.

Now is the discussion between launch tray and RWS.

First of all, the launch tray is a very simple and robust system, its cost is much lower than the standard CLU, and almost no maintenance. In addition to the metal block as the tray, there is an electronic box, a set of folding handles, an AN/PAS-13B thermal weapon sight, a battery and several cables. In addition, due to its open layout, the two-person team can hit the target faster than the standard CLU, allowing the gunner to get the next target when the loader reloads the pallet, without the need to place the CLU on the ground to reload.

In contrast, RWS requires more maintenance and is more expensive, so it hit us hard in two important categories. To make matters worse, RWS is usually based on the assumption that reloading is a non-combat operation, so the javelin is either disposable or has a terrible rate of fire in the case of a computer gunner and a deck loader. These systems are very suitable for armored vehicles and were essential when we started building an armed USV, but they were the wrong choice in this application.

In addition, regarding continuous monitoring, please remember that we have a dual-band DAS, which will do better because it constantly observes all directions in the visible and infrared bands. This is an easily overlooked system, just like on the F-35, but it will have a huge impact on daily operations.

I would worry about relying on mediocre howitzer crews. Missing with HMG at sea usually only involves hitting the ocean. The lack of a howitzer when providing NGFS may cause casualties or accidental collateral damage to friendly forces. There are many indirect fires.

Also, how do you manage fire calls? In the artillery unit, the call for firepower and adjustments drops through the fire command center or some other higher-level elements. Will these be extra crew members? Additional equipment?

In a perfect world, Marines or ground soldiers will be able to treat these NGFS firepower in the same way through the same processes and communication channels as any other indirect firepower.

I think you can break it down into direct shooting and indirect shooting. Perhaps the core personnel can be trained with 105 mm caliber direct shooting to support their use of naval targets. For indirect firepower, please add specialized artillery units equipped with FDC functions. Just an idea.

In any case, it will be interesting to see how you break down the roles of each crew member and know how many hats they need to wear.

Your criticism of RWS is correct, but the benefit is that it increases the ability of small bridge crews to quickly switch tasks. For example, if you have 3 to 5 crew members operating 105 mm, and 1 crew member working on the NLOS console, then if there is a pop-up boat threat, you may not have extra manpower. With several RWS, any bridge crew can walk a few steps to the RWS console, or better yet, press the button to switch the multi-function console to RWS mode and engage the target. Nothing left the bridge.

In addition, RWS usually has excellent aiming capabilities, can open up mounds and have stability, making it easier to achieve longer-range hits. You may be able to train multi-purpose crew members to use HMG, and possibly even maintain it, but this does not guarantee that they will become experts in the use of HMG.

Sorry for the delayed reply B.Smitty, I am trying to work with the staff to resolve the error that prevented me from replying to your post, but it seems that this will not be a quick fix, so I am replying to mine as a solution.

In any case, continue with the content and start with the howitzer crew, where the shortcomings will be more related to the rate of fire than accuracy (although ship sports will make it less accurate than guns on land). My general concept of accuracy is to have some kind of display on the gun to provide shelling data calculated by the ship’s computer. Ideally, the entire shooting process will be fully automated, so ground personnel enter the target coordinates and transmit the data to the ship, and its computer calculates the shooting solution, and the crew does not need to spend time talking over the radio to participate. If necessary, you can participate in the process Insert more people and manual relays (for example, when supporting SEALs), and someone on the bridge can always manually enter the target, but it will be faster, more reliable, and more reliable to pass it electronically from the front. It is largely transparent to the person on the other end.

Also, keep in mind that the plan is to use Spike NLOS when accuracy is of utmost importance. It can easily accomplish feats such as flying through a specific window that no artillery can match, so it is always the weapon of choice when there is a serious risk of friendly or civilian casualties.

Regarding direct shooting, I don't actually plan to do much other than warning shooting. Missiles do better in most situations, so I don't think there is a need for more than a rough "These are iron sights" training.

Continue to play the role of the crew, this is indeed Shelley's department, but the ideal situation is that everyone can do anything, so that the crew can deal with anything flexibly.

As for the pop-up threat scenario, if there is no one on the deck and there is no time to bring them there, there are two possible reactions, Spike NLOS and SeaRAM. They all operate from these terminals and can engage surface targets, so they meet the standards you set.

Finally, regarding the accuracy of guns, I am not particularly worried. Javelin has excellent long-distance accuracy and is also effective at very short distances, so if the accuracy of the crew using HMG is not the highest, it is not the end of the world. I'm not used to delving into Javelin's performance, because it is easy to enter the proprietary domain, but you can check a lot of public domain praise about its performance, and I have no doubt about its capabilities. That is, if you look at the thermal images of ships/ships at sea, you should have a good understanding of what the Javelin searcher is using and why I am so confident in it here.

It may be worth getting some artillery experts to take advantage of this idea. There may be steps that cannot be significantly automated, such as setting the fuze and cutting off explosives. In addition, there are many procedures and agreements for different situations that may be difficult to grasp for part-time staff.

https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/fm/fm6_50.pdf

Another thing to consider is how to coordinate multiple ships into a firepower unit equivalent to a turret or battalion. We usually don't just fire a howitzer at one target.

In terms of accuracy, with the advent of precision guidance kit fuzes, we can make up for a certain degree of systematic inaccuracy.

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2007/psa_apr/RussellHill.pdf

In terms of direct shooting, it may be more useful than you think in any major offshore scene in China. China can "submerge the area" with tens of thousands of fishing boats, confuse our target positioning and ISR, and act as a distributed sensor network. Your boat will be very suitable for sorting out this rubbish. Having cheap direct fired ammunition that can damage or sink offending ships will allow us to save expensive ammunition into more dangerous targets.

Not long ago, on the NavWeaps forum, I initiated a post called "Intermediate Caliber Gun (ICG) Case?".

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/the-case-for-an-intermediate-caliber-gun-icg-t31533.html

Among them, I advocate the development of a 105mm automatic mount that is lighter and cheaper than the 127mm Mk45 for small combatants like you. Due to cost reasons, I still haven't fully accepted this idea, but my goals overlap with yours. Obviously, it is much more expensive than your open mount and has a greater impact on the ship, but it will be more flexible, stronger, and less staffed. I included a hyper-subjective matrix to compare ICG with other options.

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/the-case-for-an-intermediate-caliber-gun-icg-t31533-s10.html

I think it is roughly similar to the old French compact 100mm or Russian A-190 gun carriage, but uses the existing 105mm projectiles (propellant and shell to be determined, possibly derived from 105mm tank shells). The Russians installed the A-190 on their 500-ton Bouyan-class frigate.

On the javelin, I agree. This is a master's thesis on the subject.

Sea Javelin: Analysis of Alternatives for Naval Power Protection

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a413541.pdf

I agree that it is important to involve artillery experts, especially those related to the C-130 gunship. I know that they have done a lot of pre-flight preparations, such as packing explosives, and possibly fusing their shells in the air to simplify the process, so I believe they can help us find a way to simplify the process. We may also cut some of these procedures to simplify training, but I don't want to go ahead of them and speculate on what to cut, so I will keep it in general.

As for battery coordination, this is of course an option in large operations, and unless another division plan is required, it may be done by the squadron. In other words, our tactics revolve around the elements of two scattered ships, which makes this discussion largely academic, because even with multiple units, our strength will be much lower than the equivalent strength of the battery. , So it is possible to fire all available artillery at the same target.

Regarding precision guidance kits, these are of course an option, but you must have a realistic understanding of their cost. If the guidance components and propulsion system are tied to the projectile, it becomes a cannon-launched missile instead of a cannonball, and brings all the costs and complications associated with it. LRLAP may be the best example, because it can accomplish some amazing things, but it was cancelled because at the end of the day, you have to pay for what you get.

Continue to discuss the Chinese fishing fleet, you must make sense, but I think you underestimated the infrastructure behind the javelin. To date, more than 45,000 missiles have been manufactured, and currently 2,100 missiles are produced annually. It is true that many missiles have consumed more than 5,000 combat firings, training, test firing, and export, but our inventory is still large, and we have the ability to quickly replenish them during wartime. Combining it with other weapons (especially landmines), I think the Javelin does provide the ability to solve this problem.

Linking this to your NavWeaps theme, I think you overestimated the lethality of guns on ships. If you look at World War II, it takes a lot of work to sink a ship even with 5-inch intensive artillery fire, so I seriously question whether any modern ship is capable of sinking anything substantial with only artillery fire. Smaller ships are another matter. You may be able to kill a damaged ship with a gun, but I think in most cases the best thing you really want is a mission kill. After all, Iowa has a good reason for using 16-inch artillery to sink ships, and we need to keep this in mind when evaluating what modern artillery can do.

In addition, I think you are too optimistic about the performance of guns against modern missiles. The maneuvers they performed made it almost impossible for them to hit with unguided shells until it was too late. Gun-fired missiles may be feasible, but considering the costs and challenges involved, I personally think that traditional missile launchers like SeaRAM are a better choice. The real air-related use of guns is for low-end targets such as drones, where they provide a single-shot option that is cheaper than our MHTK missiles, but naval guns themselves are quite expensive, and lasers are beginning to enter the field

In any case, having said that, assuming that your 105mm turret has only one deck, it sounds like a good choice overall, considering the way they use almost the same 100mm device, the Russians seem to agree. That is, compared to LMACC’s hybrid weapons (howitzers, javelins, Spike NLOS and MHTK; I don’t include SeaRAM because you might keep it), it is much more expensive, significantly heavier and consumes more internal volume , Requires more maintenance, and the ability to counter small ships or ground vehicles is much lower in exchange for better regional land attack performance. Nevertheless, I can see that the Navy has decided to expand the future version. If they want to pay more for naval artillery, they use such a turret instead of the base installation, but it takes a lot of work to install it around the front machinery and engine. Room, when they see it, it may not be as competitive as the small railgun.

One final note about the file linked to in your post is that this very clearly belongs to the American school of thought described by Antony G Williams. Our gun is largely regarded as a coastal bombing weapon and optimized for the role, especially in terms of minimizing costs. I think you can see that I am reluctant to push it to other missions. , Even if it may perform them well. I believe that the staff will come up with creative uses as usual, but as an engineer, I have been paying close attention to land attack missions and price tags.

The cost of each PGK is only about $7,000. The Army purchases 15-20,000 each year. Finally I read that an increment of 3 will make it fit 105 mm.

On a Chinese fishing boat, this is what I care about

https://flylifemagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/chinafishing021116-1.jpg

You are right. It takes quite a while to sink a warship, but these relatively small merchant ships do not have the same degree of damage tolerance. Several rounds of penetrating the waterline should reasonably solve the problem.

Another possibility I saw is to use APFSDS armor-piercing tank shells to penetrate the hull and track the engine. I'm not sure how feasible this is, but if it works, it might ban shooting on larger commercial ships.

For anti-missiles, I assume that guided munitions such as 76mm DART or larger HVP will be developed. Another fee must be. The cost of a RAM missile is approximately US$1 million each. SeaRAM can carry 11 bullets. If you fire two missiles on each AShM, you will become Winchester after 5 1/2 enters the boundary. For a ship of this size, this may be sufficient, and passive measures are the main defensive measure. A DART-like ammunition may be one or two orders of magnitude less? Maybe if MHTK doesn't work, this ammunition can also be used to kill drones.

Finally, when bombing ashore, another benefit of automatic installation is the rate of fire. The M119 gun group can control about 8 rpm in the first 3 minutes. Automatic turrets like A190 or Compact can fire 80 rounds per minute. Therefore, in practice, the turret can approach the equivalent firepower of two M119 gun batteries (6 guns each). The Compact is limited to 6 bursts, but the A190 seems to be able to fire for a longer time, as shown in the picture, it fires 28 rounds.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GhzgV4Ksg4

So your two ships can launch firepower equivalent to the entire 105mm BATTALION. It's NSFS now! 🙂

Of course, this kind of turret does not exist, and it takes hundreds of millions of dollars to put it into use. Is it worth the effort? Debatable. I see the benefits, but given the limited defensive funds, maybe this is not the best use of funds.

Javelins can be used to shoot at these ships, but their tandem HEAT warheads are not designed for this. It will definitely make a small boat a mess, but it is not designed to make big holes in metal bulkheads. Spike NLOS has more functions in this regard, it can select the warhead and can update the target point in flight. Therefore, this may be the preferred ammunition for damaged fishing boats on your vessel.

You need to be realistic about your comparison. As far as PGK is concerned, it is comparable to the similarly priced JDAM. Now, this capability is certainly useful, but it is still an order of magnitude more expensive than traditional artillery shells, and you will not just fire one, and the cost of strike may be similar to the cost of a missile. In close support missions, this may be worthwhile, but it makes more sense if you are fighting coastal targets or troops discovered from unguided artillery shells in the air.

Similarly, if you design a guidance package for a 76mm (or 57mm or 105mm) bullet that competes with SeaRAM, you should assume that the engagement prices of the incoming missiles for the two weapons are similar. Of course, the number of battles stored may be more, but you must remember that other missions require other types of ammunition, so it may not be possible in practice. Now, if you limit it to lower performance targets in a shorter range, it becomes cheaper because, as you pointed out, it is comparable to MHTK, but installing the gun is still a problem.

Before I continue talking about guns, I want to make sure that we are on the same page about turrets used for coastal bombing. The extra rate of fire would be a big advantage, but the cost of getting there is a huge problem.

Going back to the fishing boat, I don't expect problems with both missiles, and hope that the choice is context-specific. As you pointed out, Spike NLOS is large enough to tear them apart easily, and Javelin’s top attack profile should allow it to effectively sweep the deck with a new fragmentation sleeve and hit the bottom with its shaped charge. A hole. Note that the distance defocusing of the shaped charge is actually good for the javelin here, because it should result in a larger hole, because mild steel (or possibly aluminum) is difficult to resist. In addition, I tend to install the Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher on the bow shaft bracket (it can be interchanged with Browning), so if necessary, it should be easy to complete the damaged ship with a few grenades near the waterline .

As for APFSDS, this is an interesting idea (although obviously not relevant here). I am not particularly familiar with the layout of merchant ships, so I cannot assess the feasibility, but I see a lot of potential problems that may make it impossible, not just a difficult to judge lens. For LMACC, the answer to the warring cargo ship is obviously to board it as much as possible (this may involve shooting the deck and superstructure first), if it weren't for LRASM or 8 would definitely drop the cargo ship (and make taxpayers cry).

About PGK: I think there are only two artillery pieces in your two ship elements. You may have no choice but to use PGK or other guided munitions to provide effective firepower to reach the range you imagine (20-30 km) . If you look at page 9 of this PDF,

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2008/fuze/VABurke.pdf

At 20 kilometers, the expected CEP of the unguided shell is 125m. At 30 kilometers, it grows to 267 meters.

50% of the bullets will fall within the radius within these ranges. Therefore, for two guns, at 16 rpm, 8 rpm falls within these radii. You may not be able to effectively deal with any goals within these ranges with any degree of certainty. In essence, it will only be a harassment fire.

Regarding the cost of PGK: If you are willing to fire more than $100,000 Spike NLOS through the window to kill a sniper, or a $70,000 javelin to kill a small boat, then firing multiple $7,000 ammunition starts to sound reasonable .

Regarding Mk19 and fishing boats: There are a few recent examples where we tried to sink a fishing boat with automatic artillery, which is similar in effect to Mk19 (but more accurate). Take the USCGC Anacapa trying to sink the abandoned Ryou-Un Maru as an example. It fired more than a hundred 25mm bullets at it, but eventually had to use its water cannon to submerge it. The small 25mm bullet just didn't punch a hole large enough to allow water to penetrate fast enough. In this regard, the 40mm HEDP grenade will not be better.

Regarding the automatic gun holder: We agree that it will have a significant impact on cost and design. It was originally one of the "engineering itch" that I needed to scratch in my mind. There really is no progress in this direction, so I don't think it will happen unless we start to see conflicts that actually require large, frequent, low-level NGFS.

This is fair to PGK, although the value of harassment firepower should not be underestimated. The PDF you linked also makes an interesting point about PGK's reduced maximum range, so we may not want to eliminate regular rounds altogether.

In addition, its "PGK Mission Slideshow" indirectly emphasizes the fact that no traditional artillery system is particularly suitable for attacking entrenched positions and other point targets, regardless of whether there is a PGK, so you must remain realistic about your goals. We are also equipped with Spike NLOS for those precision strike missions, and we can use two weapons at the same time to get the best of both worlds. A good example is to place cannons around the bunker to prevent enemy infantry from using it to suppress firepower, and then mute the bunker by launching spiked NLOS missiles.

Continuing to discuss Mk 19, it is difficult to say how accurate this comparison is, because the two are very different weapons, and both have a dizzying variety of bullets. That is, many automatic shells are designed to penetrate the target and then explode inside the target, which is very useful for tearing and disabling the ship, but since the damage mainly bypasses the hull, it will be difficult to sink it. In contrast, most 40mm grenades are point-detonated (exceptions are usually air-explosive shells and special effects shells), so they should tear a hole in the hull that is larger than penetrating automatic shells. In addition, although I can't find a reliable open source fill figure, the 40mm grenade should carry a greater blasting charge because the volume increases with the cube of the diameter, and the lower launch stress of the grenade should allow for a thinner shell wall. Also, please keep in mind that the context is to complete a damaged target, because I fully hope that this is a follow-up use, only if the initial missile attack failed to sink the ship and we don’t want to board the ship to install the sinking charge (may use some 105mm shells) . Nevertheless, I do think that we should test these rounds against suitable targets to determine the best option for sinking the ship, and if we find that none of them are suitable for the role, then consider developing new dive rounds.

In the end, I know exactly what you think of the gun, and I completely agree with your conclusion. I will go a little further. I think a simple artillery platform (maybe an Army Paladin/MLRS parked on the existing hull) is more likely to be a short-term response to this situation, and we are farther away from introducing railguns. It's getting closer and closer to use, so I hope the money will go to them instead of the 105mm turret.

The two most common rounds are HE and HEDP. HEDP may be the one you must use here, but it will only make a coin-sized hole in the target.

This is an image of the effect of two wheels on a concrete wall,

https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-2dd3eca2ea1930fc2b83f9990195f82f.webp

Please note that the HE bomb just hit a ball on the surface.

https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2002/gun/farrand.pdf

This is the effect of the 105mm HEP bullet on the double-layer reinforced concrete wall.

https://imgur.com/2JNvvHI.png

Now of course, this is concrete instead of diaphragm steel, and we may not use HEP bullets, but I bet the size difference is also huge.

Yes, there must be a problem with the grenade. We obviously need to conduct some tests to understand their effect on the diaphragm steel, because tearing is possible, especially when subjected to a series of shocks, but this is a very real problem. The good news is that this should be a relatively easy test to run because there are a large number of launchers and bullets around, and it shouldn't be too difficult to find a representative target because the boat is always scrapping.

Of course, as you pointed out, the howitzer will obviously open a larger hole, but it may be difficult to tolerate because I am not sure what its minimum angle of fire is.

How would you allow 15 crew members to operate 6 or 7 exposed base javelins? When fighting is expected, will everyone go to the deck to operate the javelin? In fact, the concealment of the garbage barge is much better, you can hide the 155 howitzer or MLRS under the garbage bag. Sailors and Marines can jump out of Oscar the Grouch style with javelins and stinger to provide the same or better abilities, wrapped in galvanized steel armor! This idea is stinking.

The Navy must stop making everything so many tasks, otherwise it will only end with a Burke or some small broken ships-which is still too valuable to be lost. If it wants a cheap anti-submarine warfare platform to block a passage, then buy an AIP submarine or several P8s, which are easier to survive than warships. If it wants to launch missiles at the enemy combat fleet, it can launch the missiles from the aircraft so that it can reach the launch site faster and re-arm faster. If it wants to board and search for ships, please repair some old USCG knives. If it wants a radar picket, build a picket boat or submarine. I can't think of a realistic mission. The spacecraft you propose will perform better than other platforms at a lower cost. In fact, this is the whole problem of naval thinking today. Your practice starts by buying a ship and trying to justify it. Start thinking about how to perform some useful tasks most effectively.

Regarding javelin staffing, it depends to a large extent on the context. In most cases, a single mount is sufficient because its performance is better than a 30mm automatic cannon, so the staffing will be insignificant. Even in more challenging situations, the threat is likely to be limited to a single arc, so four mounts can provide full firepower for that side, while leaving a large number of free personnel to operate Spike NLOS and surveillance drones. In other words, if we anticipate that all mounts will need to be manned (such as the war with Iran), the crew may be overextended. Therefore, in this case, we will temporarily bring the USMC Javelin team to provide manpower. Operate all mounts, because we already have a lot of extra beds for them.

As for the rest, I suggest re-reading the "'enough' is not enough" part through "LMACC Design", because I delve into most of your arguments there, and pay special attention to your proposed aircraft comparison. This is our main mission role Real competition. Also note that although we have the ability to perform some secondary missions, we ensure that they will not seriously conflict with our main anti-ship missions, and most importantly, will not meaningfully increase the price of ships. That said, you did suggest some other alternatives, so I will continue to address them here.

Artillery barge: This is of course a viable concept that can provide additional fire support at a low price, but it is essentially a temporary solution and is only suitable for extremely limited situations. If needed in wartime, I can definitely see such things, but the Navy cannot invest in peacetime. In addition, although the javelin and stinger are viable defensive weapons, the limitations of the platform make it unusable for offensive purposes because it is extremely vulnerable to anti-ship missiles. This is something you parked between a pair of Burkes to hit the beach, not something you use yourself, but the reactivation in Iowa proves the usefulness of the dedicated artillery platform. My goal for howitzers and Spike NLOS is not to provide a huge, dedicated artillery company, but to transport more weapons to the sea on the edge so that the navy can bombard them on a large scale when they need it, because Iowa The states are gone forever, and Zumwalts cannot replace them.

ASW: I agree that it doesn't make sense to use this platform for ASW. I explicitly excluded the type of platform you objected to earlier in this article, and omitted any form of ASW device from the baseline configuration. Even the ASW variant is not a traditional anti-submarine deterrent as you might think, but a platform that can carry a Tomahawk-type ASW torpedo from hundreds of miles away to hit targets detected by other platforms. This will allow a ship to potentially close multiple choke points simultaneously with an unmanned sensor network, and it can even do this while hiding in a place completely inaccessible to submarines like a river.

Patrol Boat: Although you initially suggested using the old USCG hulls, your initial suggestion is not entirely effective because we are used to giving them away, selling them, or throwing them underground, but Mark VI patrol boats are basically the navy for this Answer questions and provide answers to your ideas. It definitely has the ability to provide cheap patrol assets for those VBSS missions, and it does a good job of completing the work there, but the Navy ended production in 2017 after only purchasing 12 ships to focus on high-end combat. Therefore, as you can see in our design, any new patrol platform must be related to high-end combat.

Radar Picket: This is the job of USV, and our plan is to cooperate with these assets. Please note that we deliberately omitted the main radar to avoid detection because it is relatively easy to locate and destroy the active radar, so this is irrelevant to the discussion.

As for your general comments on the task, this is pretty sure. For decades, the Naval Graduate School and the Naval War College have been discussing the need for a small, heavily armed ship. If you want to know more about it, check out the late Wayne Hughes (Wayne Hughes), the author of "Fleet Tactics", and he has written numerous articles on the subject. The real innovation here is achieved by carefully handling secondary tasks, capabilities, and systems to provide as much additional utility as possible without significantly affecting costs. That is, if you want tasks, here is a list of tasks that are directly executed by the baseline variant:

Anti-ship land attack force projecting offensive anti-ship sweeping defensive anti-ship fleet screen light maritime special operations support naval artillery support patrol partnership establishment of existing blockade law enforcement search and rescue UUV operations (including anti-cable and anti-seabed sensor operations) MCM support Limited HADR support for submarine surveying lights

Note that this omits the extra tasks performed by the variant, and the broader influence of the early command force on the fleet, and reduces the workload for larger assets.

I suspect that MHTK was overly dependent on MHTK before it proved itself. Even so, it may only be useful for drones and rocket/artillery/mortar ammunition. It is unclear whether it has the ability to counter cruise missiles.

In addition, it almost certainly needs radar. Optical sighting does not provide the distance and speed information required for engagement.

The Army is studying some small AESA arrays that may be suitable for use by the Navy. KuRFS is a relatively small K-band system for anti-UAV/RAM. RADA's MHR series fixed S-band radars are being used on Stryker air defense variants.

https://www.rada.com/capabilities/land-radars/all-threat-app-menu.html

In addition to SeaRAM, you can consider adding a miniature VLS like ExLS, which can carry a combination of missiles like Hellfire, SAM like CAMM or VL-RAM, and mini cruise missiles. Maybe use seekers and warheads to adapt to MALD.

VLS systems are relatively inexpensive and require less maintenance than trainable systems such as SeaRAM.

MHTK is to a large extent an auxiliary weapon system designed to strengthen defenses against these threats. If it is effective against cruise missiles, that's fine, but its main job is to prevent drone swarm attacks like the Russians dealt with in Syria, because such attacks will only proliferate in the coming decades. We may include a small radar like the one you mentioned, we can use our optical device to prompt, but the missile does have an active seeker, so pure optical orbit should be sufficient, especially if we have time to change It is combined with a laser rangefinder to collect complete target data, just like the case for these quadcopters.

As for small VLS such as SeaRAM and ExLS or Mk 56, there are many reasons for this decision. Most importantly, VLS is a more powerful system that will take up our limited internal space and penetrate both decks because it cannot be installed in existing missile bays. It also creates performance issues for our optical cueing method, because it cannot start its bonding procedure before we make a radiation/no-radiation decision, while SeaRAM can start bonding without radiation, perhaps even based on optical data only Carry out ignition. Our optical priority approach to improving survivability through EMCON also limits our ability to take advantage of the longer range of these larger missiles and raises concerns about minimum range. Another important point is the versatility of the fleet, because SeaRAM is already in service with the US Navy, which has a large inventory of missiles. From this point of view, it is a better choice, especially when compared to ExLS, which focuses on foreign missiles. Finally, the cost difference is not that big, because we currently have no fire control radar at all except the fire control radar installed on SeaRAM, so adding support for VLS will consume most of the money saved by removing SeaRAM, especially if we Use fixed arrays to minimize moving parts. Now, to sum up, SeaRAM does need more maintenance. This is a serious problem in this application. This is very correct, but in the final analysis, it is designed for this last-stroke defensive engagement, so It is a better choice than VLS.

In addition, with regard to mini cruise missiles, Spike NLOS partially fills this role today and provides us with a vacancy in future future versions, so adding VLS for this is meaningless.

What kind of seakeeping capability does this ship have in ocean-going operations?

Although our hull has not yet been finalized, I cannot give a definite answer, but seakeeping is the top priority. Compared with Cyclone, the reduced speed and length and beam ratio are beneficial to us, so the seakeeping should be significantly better and more comparable to Sentinel-class cutting machines. In other words, our upper deck configuration should be able to withstand big waves better, because the crew does not need the upper deck, the invisible shape of the front of the superstructure should help guide the waves away from the upper deck, so that we can work in more severe situations Survive the weather.

The authors did make efforts of homesteaders in designing a new type of light surface battleship, but in the end their analysis failed on two levels:

1) They created the Swiss Army Knife version of the small surface battleship. It tried to do too many things. The inevitable result was that the cost would far exceed their US$96 million estimate, and these ships would not do anything. They wanted to have a light manned surface warship, mainly for launching LRASM—a missile with a range of at least 30 times the range of the ship’s sensors, which meant it could not function without a plane— —Like the F-35, or some of the larger versions of the armory aircraft they describe here — this ship should be a replacement. And this ship still cannot survive in any battle scene-it is a "shot and die" platform.

2) The real solution here-not looking for a solution to a problem, but a real solution to a real problem-is the airplane. Airplanes are much more efficient in doing all the things that LMACC should be able to do, but they are not very good at it. The sensor range of airplanes is much better and farther; airplanes such as F-35 are fully survivable, rather than "fight and die." You don’t need arsenal planes-we already have these F-35s in our fleet and air force fleet today. They are fully capable of hunting down and killing enemy surface fleets and providing better ground combat support. Unavailable, and they can survive, and they are much cheaper. The F-35B now costs less than $100 million and only requires a pilot/mission manager crew member. An F-35B can carry 4 LRASMs or JSMs, while F-35A (the cost is still less than US$80 million) or C can deploy up to 6 JSMs (still having an ultra-long range of 300 nautical miles).

The F-35's reloading capability is much better than any ship would have hoped for. The F-35 has a combat radius of up to 700 nautical miles, or unrestricted air refueling. According to the regulations issued for the execution of the mission, it will fly home to refuel and reload, and perform two to three such missions every day... And any ship, once it empties its magazines, faces the return journey of reloading and re-entering the battle, measured in weeks, not hours.

Ultimately, the US Navy does not need small coastal warships for surface warfare or amphibious warfare, because we have a vast ocean separating us from possible enemies. Our allies are very close to imaginable enemies such as China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, and of course we need such ships.

The U.S. Navy has the existing LCS fleet, the PC-1 patrol (and its eventual replacement), and the next generation of small amphibious ships (more or less equivalent to today’s LST during World War II), which is now being designed. Much better. , Of course, there are aviation amphibious ships carrying F-35B and large deck aircraft carriers carrying F-35C, as well as land-based F-35s of the United States Marine Corps, United States Navy and United States Air Force. We will get more revenue through this fleet, and it already exists today.

The real purpose of the USV or light manned surface warship is not to act as the Swiss army knife of the fleet-but to provide long-range picketing sensors and anti-submarine warfare assets. Except for anything needed for self-defense or anti-submarine warfare, thinking of them as bad guys on a weapon platform will only result in a huge waste of military funds and manpower.

I agree that the best task that small combatants can add is anti-submarine warfare, but the problem with aircraft is that they are still only associated with so many fixed points. The airplane is a hub and spokes network, not a complete network of independent nodes without spokes. Yes, small fighter jets need to be large enough to use good level 3 drones that can provide useful target data. A fast fast ferry design can be reloaded at 840 nautical miles in 24 hours with a heavier load than an airplane. It will establish a separate fast supply chain to arm the battle. I think your fighter loading capacity is a bit optimistic. 4 The LRASM on the Super Hornet will force it to take some shots because it exceeds the retraction capacity. In addition, what is self-defense? In addition, the flight cost of 35B in 2021 is 121.5 million U.S. dollars.

Before I start the discussion, I need to bring up a very important thing. You mentioned PC replacement​​, which is part of LMACC. Keep this in mind, because future large surface combatants will almost certainly be more expensive than CG(X), so we will buy fewer of them and need to make up for the fleet elsewhere. If you want a detailed mathematical decomposition, please click on the link in the description of my previous article on fleet composition. In the article, I showed how these small warships allow us to meet our fleet size needs and our demand for high-end water surfaces. Combatants who violated the budget.

Having said that, I will build on James Milliken's post, because he has already talked about some of your points, such as fighter missile capabilities.

1A) Regarding multi-tasking capabilities, we are careful to perform edge operations there. This ship may not be an excellent amphibious warship, but these capabilities will not affect its ability as an offensive missile platform, so it will become an excellent network shooting game.

1B) There is quite a lot of analysis behind this price tag, and when I compare the Coast Guard variant with the real numbers of similar sentinel class, it passed the sniffing test. The real key is to abandon the radar carried by most warships, as this will quickly become expensive, and is only a countermeasure against the severely opposed "shoot here" sign.

1C) As we clearly stated, the main strategy is to use the USV as a long-range reconnaissance aircraft to find the target that the ship will strike, otherwise we will use passive sensors like electronic warfare kits to detect without being detected. In addition, a key advantage of this range is that it allows the crew to fly their missile around the target and hit it from another direction to cover the launch point, instead of directly launching an attack that the enemy can follow. This is essential for survivability, because even if we launch stealth missiles, it is difficult for the enemy to select us from civilian traffic. This is why no other deployed missiles are suitable for our needs.

2A) Although the F-35 is a good platform, its combat range is limited. Until we weaken the enemy's A2/AD network, we will not be able to allow aircraft carriers or suitable bases to enter a useful range. The initial opening phase is when LMACC shines, because it can sneak under this umbrella, start to disassemble the A2/AD network from the inside, and create space for the aircraft carrier to carry the F-35.

2B) Ground combat support is more than just throwing bombs. In terms of precision ammunition, ships and aircraft have similar capabilities, but the ship’s howitzers can execute areas and suppress attacks that are difficult for most aircraft. Of course, the real difference is that infantry can easily disembark and disembark, which is obviously impossible for a tactical aircraft like the F-35. Considering that a ship can wander at sea for days or weeks at a time, the overall advantage is obvious.

2C) Based on James Milliken's view on aircraft payload, the loading you describe for F-35 requires the use of external weapons, which will affect its stealth and survivability. In the face of real threats, you can only use a pair of JSMs at most, and assume that the United States has purchased them completely.

Entering your unclassified points, you seem to think that these ships will be used for homeland defense. But in fact, it's not. They have a very long range and excellent seakeeping, allowing them to project power overseas and fight in areas with limited infrastructure.

In the end, you seem to miss my paragraph discussing ASW because I explained in detail why these types of ships cannot perform traditional ASW tasks in a useful way. I will not reiterate my argument here, but suggest that you re-read this section.

In general, I think this is a well-thought-out article that touches on many issues related to DMO and the Navy’s preference for large-scale multi-mission platforms. In other words, I have a few points to clarify or think about:

1. LMACC is a great "small build, large test" platform for the navy to perfect the CONOP and engineering of unmanned ships. It can even evolve into an optional manned platform to remove crews for certain types of missions. I also appreciate the thoughts invested in operations other than war, which can have a large "display flag" input. 2. Your focus on passive survivability is very useful. Do you still consider thermal characteristics? Some missile boats emit exhaust gas after mixing with sea water. In addition, you mentioned acoustic characteristics. Do you see deceptive sound systems as an option to improve survivability? Does a pump jet used for close operation negatively affect your acoustic characteristics? 3. You mentioned that there is no vertical replenishment helipad due to space constraints, but a larger open area (such as the focsle of a ship) can be used to unload the loaded food or weapons. 4. You mentioned AN/SLQ-32. Do you want a version with electronic attack options? This may cause the ship to be eliminated as a US warship, which runs counter to the idea of ​​"integration". 5. I see that shipborne DAS that requires a high degree of automation (due to the small number of crews) requires a lot of research and development costs. How do you think this cost risk is managed? Will this be mixed into the COMBATSS-21 CMS? 6. You noticed that there is no designated hull. Can you discuss what you are considering? Are you cooperating with private companies to conduct feasibility studies? 7. Land attack and boat defense are different problems and require different solutions. What is the basis? You should consider a single multi-purpose weapon (which can be used against small ships, helicopters, and ground targets) that integrates the missile requirements into a single launcher, which may be similar to the launcher on the Korean PKX-B. It seems that there are many multi-mode small rocket/missile conversions or new build systems that can be packaged into one or two launchers. I understand the drive to reduce costs, but weapon system integration can do this and improve logistical support. 8. You use (presumably) unstable deck guns to respond to land attacks, which will greatly reduce accuracy. The increased cost associated with stabilizing the turret can meet the accuracy requirements, making this weapon more useful. 9. I recommend determining the rank and qualifications of the ship's commander (LT-qualified WTI deputy is only WTI). 10. I recommend sticking to the ASROC secondary Tomahawk missile. When the tomahawk reaches the submarine's datum, the potential position of the submarine will be far enough to offset the effective range of the torpedo. 11. You said that these ships are in small groups, how can they communicate with each other without attracting attention? Could it be invisible laser communication?

Another good article, I look forward to replying!

Thanks, I am glad you like it. You have a lot of great ideas and questions here, so I will work on your neatly arranged list.

1. Not long ago, I published a blog post about this on USNI, but my overall view of optional staffing is that we are moving towards a world of ambiguity. A quick example is to re-commission and automate old ships to expand the fleet during wartime, so you are clearly correct, and I think this is the ideal platform for experimenting with these concepts.

2. Thermal characteristic management is obviously an important factor to consider, but like RCS, we must be aware of the need to integrate into civil transportation, so we don't want to go too far here. In terms of acoustics, we will have to study the cost of active cancellation and other technologies, but my guess is that this will be a bridge too far. Having said that, the pump spray does reduce the noise entering the water, and our electric drive makes the boat quieter, so I think we have no problem in this regard.

3. This is of course an option, just like putting it in the water and rolling it in through the boat bay.

4. Yes, electronic attacks are critical, especially for missile defense, because high-power interference beams will obviously make it difficult for boats to be hit by missiles. As for the more general question of how it interacts with EMCON, it goes deep into the highly confidential world of electronic warfare, so it cannot be discussed here.

5. The advantage of DAS is that most of the work has already been completed. The technology has already been deployed on the F-35, so this is an adaptation issue, not a new development.

6. We will use a new design to optimize the hull to meet our needs. In fact, the hull is the cheapest part of a warship and has a huge impact on the rest of the ship, so it is usually a good place to spend a little more money. By minimizing design conflicts and providing better performance, this investment usually results in more savings elsewhere, especially because we have unusual needs for regular transoceanic voyages.

7. The point I want to emphasize here is that I write from a demand perspective. Before I return to the system, your question is fundamentally decomposed back to requirements. Spike NLOS can accomplish all these tasks to a certain extent, but it has some limitations and requires other weapons to complete. Most notably, it has a significant minimum range, it is covered by a javelin, and howitzers are always cheaper when performing suppression tasks. In addition, LRASM and RAM clearly provide more powerful surface strike and air defense capabilities, respectively, but they are mainly used for tasks that require their capabilities.

8. No need. Spike NLOS can fly through a specific window at 25 kilometers, so it always outperforms a gun when accuracy is required. Where guns come into play are regional targets, suppressing firepower, suspicious locations or warning shots. In these cases, accuracy is not that important. Of course we can make it more accurate, but it will add a considerable amount of cost with a relatively small return, so I don't think it is worth it. In addition, if we change our mind later, we can always cut it into future pieces, because I expect existing demand will translate into a large number of production runs.

9. I think these ships will be commanded by a lieutenant commander like Cyclone, but given the reduction in crew numbers, lieutenants are also possible.

10. Scope is the key factor here. Remember, the goal is for the unmanned platform to detect the target and then engage with the weapons on the ship. The weapons on the ship should be kept at a long distance to support multiple drones. This requires a longer range than ASROC’s 22 km range, and the Tomahawk is the best way to get it. Now, I agree that we may not need or can’t take full advantage of the Tomahawk’s thousand-mile range, but it is the best platform to carry torpedoes. The network allows us to update the landing points in flight, so we can definitely hit targets far beyond ASROC. Scope.

11. We have two main communication systems. The first one is F-35's multifunctional advanced data link (MADL), which is used for invisible line-of-sight communication, which naturally allows us to receive target data from F-35. The second is L3Harris's Falcon III® RF-7800W (HF), which transmits directly upwards to bounce the signal from the ionosphere and achieve trans-horizon communication while concealing the origin of transmission. In addition to this, we obviously have the usual satellite communications and standard maritime radio, but this is mainly used for peacetime operations.

Thanks again for your long and thoughtful comment!

Whenever someone gets such precision in the low-level details of years of conceptual design and there are many changes in the actual service, I am worried that I will miss all the high-level ideas.

We should establish speed, operating draught, range, and SWAP-C boundaries for the system and crew space; based on realistic requirements and rhythm threats, but don't worry about trivial matters.

If the goal is to imagine in more detail, from representative engine machinery (actually not many options), remote weapon stations flexible enough to handle possible guns and missiles (COTS options exist), flights/ships used in the example system Facilities, and allow the crew to have a certain degree of flexibility.

The biggest mistake that the LCS program brings to you is to specify design requirements without verification and now promise strict tolerances. Success depends on equipment and CONOPS that do not yet exist. Instead of spending all your energy on a specific design that cannot survive contact with reality, worry about the big idea so you know what trade-offs to make when realizing the concept.

Just like you want to move a container on a ship, the weight of the containers is not the size they contain.

The key point to remember is that these small, heavily armed warships have a long analytical legacy behind them. The most famous form is Street Fighter, which is the predecessor of the concept of LCS, but it is only one of many forms. We hope to put this design into production, and between the increased flexibility over previous iterations and the high level of interest in these types of ships, we think this will happen.

In addition, the engine is far behind in the sequence of operations. You start with capabilities and systems, iterate there until you have a winner, and then wrap it with a hull and power unit at the end of the process. If you want to prove this to yourself, go to the website of a large diesel engine manufacturer like Caterpillar and see the variety for yourself.

A true naval analyst will know better. There are not so many choices in the size/output suitable for high-speed battleships. In addition, you can open the hood of a car or tractor, but on a ship, the engine is a component that you will usually use during the life of the ship, so please choose it well and make sure that the engineering equipment is working properly!

If you want to turn design into production, find a reliable existing power system to get the required speed for your hull size, and then use the remaining energy to design the bridge and operating space, and map out how the ship will sail To this day and fight one day. Be rigorous and honest about how much space and weight you reserve for each weapon system, but don't worry about the details. Suitable weapons will change from prototype to production and will change throughout the life of the ship, but your engine will not.

I am an engineer, not an analyst. This means that I can look at my needs, look at the systems on the market, and figure out exactly how to put them together, not just the work that has been done. I am unwilling to announce the details, because the final selection must go through a competitive bidding, and our exact power requirements will not be locked until we finalize the hull shape, but I have identified a power unit that can meet our needs And used to adjust the size of the engine room.

Why does the Navy keep reinventing a flat tire? No experience in small battleships? Armed with US Coast Guard National Security Knives, this is your small warship. But no, the Navy must provide career development for officers and cadres and provide more funding for the defense industry-this will hire retired naval officers who have reinvented badly flat tires.

It will be a frigate, and therefore part of what Shelley calls the "Leviathan Navy." I did not participate in the selection of FFG(X), but it is generally believed that National Security Cutter is the basis of HII entry, so it is reasonable to assume that the winning FREMM is better designed.

Although we certainly need that frigate, and I hope it will become an important part of the fleet in the next few decades, it really cannot be compared with LMACC. In the case of frigates performing various escort missions, we focus on offensive missions, which are more suitable for providing a sense of presence, because the navy can purchase these squadrons at the price of frigates.

As for the lack of experience with small warships, the last time we built something like this was in the 1970s, so this experience has long since died. The closest we come these days are the hardly armed hurricanes and larger littoral combat ships, and the Coast Guard is clearly not the place to look for ship killers.

Just don't buy hulls with discontinued engines like the Ambassador III. In addition to the range, what is the food and store endurance of the boat? I know that LCS has struggled to gain up to 21 days of endurance from the beginning and is definitely upgrading to cope with the expanded crew.

Well, the good news for the first part is that I am planning a long-term construction plan to prevent these types of errors. We may want to fund a single hull to start, but I think once they are put into use, everyone will be happy to build more ships, because we always need more ships, which is a good way to build a fleet.

As for endurance, it obviously depends on the number of people on board and the amount of cargo dedicated to other tasks, but our mission profile requires long-term endurance, so in most cases, one month is the minimum, there may be two or More.

Wonderful article and analysis. You should be very proud of this thought-provoking, clear and wise analysis.

This ship should be the next generation of surface warships, but to a large extent relies on manually operated artillery; the 1850s solution of the 2050s concept. If the 105mm howitzer and pivot mount are not worth installing an automatic turret that can be controlled from the bridge, then they may not be worth installing on a ship at all.

This is an idea worth thinking about: a combined bridge/CIC, with command, navigation and engineering consoles in the front, windows and walking rooms all around, and sensor/weapon stations in the middle. I imagined two rows of three CIC consoles, which may be set up a few steps, so OOD can see everything on the bridge from any place where you walk around.

In peacetime, there are 4 duty on the bridge: OOW, conn, nav, and engineering. In most cases, these 4 can take on the lookout task. The rest of the watch section will be a roamer for physical inspection of the engine and other spaces. The total number of people on duty is 6 to 8, and a crew of 30 or less is allowed to have 3 or even 4 people on duty.

The full GQ will add 6 operators to the CIC and possibly other watchmen/radio operators, increasing the bridge crew to about 12 people, but these 12 people will be able to fight the entire ship from a central location , While all other GQ stations are dedicated to damage control.

For detailed information about ship design, please see how to get multiple uses from as many tactical equipment as possible. Set the light gun on the lower part of the deck or the lower part of the superstructure, but install the target sensor ball on the higher place and operate independently, and use the EO/IR ranging function for navigation and positioning, intelligence collection, and even similarly configured ships Perform non-radio frequency communication.

The wonderful thing is that if you can work out an integrated bridge/CIC both in terms of technology and procedures, then the rest of the ship is very flexible. In fact, your options in engineering factories are still limited, but you can expand or reduce the scale and capabilities according to the broader fleet mission and financial reality. It is much better to build from the concept of control than to build inward from the detailed selection of weapons.

For bridge layout, this is not a bad concept, although the final decision will be made by our human-machine interface experts, and it is best to use a model for testing. In other words, our plan is to completely abandon the traditional watch structure and use an automatic system to alert the crew when needed. By providing a flexible response to any situation that arises, this will enable smaller crew members to operate the ship safely. This mission concept is the core tenant of Shelley’s original human/machine team work. Compared to the traditional arrangement you are discussing, it allows us to reduce the crew by half.

Going back to weapons, there are two distinct reasons for these decisions. The Javelin pintle mount is manned because it is the most effective option. You can't reload the RWS as quickly as the pivot. Doing so requires someone on the deck to awkwardly coordinate with the gunner below, which will not solve the problem anyway. Coupled with the additional costs and maintenance of RWS, the decision is not even over yet.

As for the howitzer, it almost entirely depends on the cost. Nowadays, the Navy seems not interested in meeting the needs of naval artillery support, and the LMACC team mainly wants to ship missiles here, so we don’t want to invest a lot of money (and maintenance) on deck artillery. Therefore, the howitzer allows us to meet this demand basically for free, and it also provides us with a good way to issue warnings during the routine patrols that the ship will spend most of its time on.

Finally, it sounds like we are more or less on the same page in terms of optics. The only nuance is that, unsurprisingly, you did not think too much about what DAS allows the spacecraft to do as we did, but it will only make everything you think about better.

In 2020, or even in 2030, the US Navy will not purchase ships without continuous bridge duty allowances. Alarm sensors will not replace good watchers. You can plan to reduce and eventually eliminate standing watches, but don't bet your design on an unmanned bridge. My bridge/duty concept may be able to operate with fewer consoles and watchmen, but I think a ship can use spare workstations and empty shelves better than other methods.

When you accuse others of not thinking about things, everything about your ship’s conceptual weapon is either a concept that a wise naval architect chose to skip, or a concept that has long been abandoned. The firing range of the FGM-148 javelin may be slightly longer than that of the Mk 46 30mm cannon, but the carriage has 400 rounds available and sends them to the maximum range in about 5 seconds, while the javelin can only fire about about 1000 yards. Close range may not matter, but within the range, the javelin is not as effective, and the cost of missing it is much higher, whether it is in dollars or your limited magazine capacity.

Javelin is designed for a very special purpose-to kill the tank with an infantry carrying case-but if you don't kill the tank and the weight is not a problem, then it is not a good choice. The same goes for your howitzer. Unless you invest in a powered impact hammer or other loading aids, you are looking for a gun that requires about 5 crew members but only provides a continuous rate of fire of 3 rpm. If it is exposed on the deck, PM will be very painful. In terms of utility troubles, you'd better leave it on the dock rather than carry it with you.

Finally, DAS is not magic. This is the advantage of a bunch of small cameras because they can cover 360 degrees, not because any one of them is equally good. If you want to shoot something, you need a dedicated sensor optimized for fire control, which will be a rotating EO/IR ball, because you can't afford such a good DAS. If the cost allows, you can have both at the same time, but don't try to make DAS something that it is not.

I have no practical experience with most of the equipment we are talking about, but I have spent years researching what the Army, Navy, and Air Force have installed on their platforms and why. They are not necessarily right, and you are not necessarily wrong, but I can't think of anyone putting their money on ideas like yours.

First of all, Shelley is the one who handles the workload of the crew, not me. If you want to discuss this in detail, you should reply to his comments and discuss with him. I make sure that this ship can accept traditional crews to mitigate this risk, because I agree that the Navy needs a backup plan, but the main plan is still an autonomous system to manage the ship and notify the crew when needed, until he says otherwise or Congress makes it Conditions of financing.

Moving on, the Javelin is significantly better than the 30mm automatic cannon. The data supporting its effectiveness was only exposed after Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated their flexibility. Although the pivot installation is a very new innovation, the javelin has been put into use as an anti-ship defense weapon. You seem to have very limited knowledge of the capabilities of the javelin, but in short, it has proven to be very effective on everything from ships to snipers, and has excellent reliability in thousands of combat shots.

In order to provide a detailed comparison between the two, we will look at the operational differences. 30mm machine guns need to fire, wait for them to reach the target, wait for splashes to clear, perform damage assessment, and possibly repeat the process at least once to kill the enemy (especially if you miss a lot of bullets at a distance) before you can Start looking for new goals. In contrast, the lethality of the javelin is far more than a few 30mm bullets, so the moment the trigger is pulled, the target is functionally dead, and the gunner can immediately start searching for new missiles while the loader is preparing for the next missile. Goal, although a longer load time means that the total engagement rate will be similar. The stored total damage may also be similar, because the automatic cannon needs to fire a considerable number of bullets for each target, and if the direct inventory is exhausted and the automatic cannon completely stops working, the Javelin missile can easily be installed from the opposite side to prepare the round has been used over. In addition, Javelin's extra range is a major advantage in these cluster defense scenarios, as it helps prevent enemies from entering the range of your own ship.

As for the howitzer, I am very aware of its limitations. I chose it because it can provide naval fire support almost free of charge, and 105mm artillery like this has been widely proven for more than a century, so there is no doubt that it can provide it. Yes, more advanced gun mounts will provide a higher rate of fire, but in US service, the only ships with greater naval gunfire capabilities are cruisers and destroyers, which are usually too expensive to take the risks of this role. If you have a better choice, I listen, but unless the procurement and maintenance costs are comparable to howitzers, I can almost guarantee that the Admiralty will prefer cheaper howitzers.

As for DAS, my point is simple. It can receive the optical communication transmitted by the laser added to the EO/IR turret according to your previous suggestions, and because it does not require a dedicated receiver and solves some sensor ball task problems, it can work better.

Regarding the last sentence, I'm really not sure what you mean when you are talking about the idea of ​​investing money. This is of course a new configuration, and the interaction between systems provides new advantages, but most of these technologies have already been applied in some way.

I think the flaw in the crew concept lies in their boldness, not analysis, so apart from noticing that Uncle Sam will refuse, I think it's worthless to sweat in the details. I focused on the fit of the weapon because it has major flaws in details and a serious lack of imagination.

If you spend your money on a suitable gun stand, you can do many things that you can't do with a javelin. -Using EO/IR, rangefinder and good ballistic computer, even a single shot should not miss non-maneuverable targets. Through some modeling of the possible maneuvers, the short burst covers all the positions the target may move to during the flight. – If you add radar, your gun can penetrate any weather or smoke screen. If you want an advantage, you can generate smoke yourself. -This level of sensors and computers allows for higher automation than your Javelin team. In the most extreme case, a sailor can set the key to "special auto" and watch the gun mount automatically destroy every target in its area. And the number of your crew supports some automatic cannons better than a few two-person javelin teams. – Even in a more controllable semi-automatic mode, the gun can engage multiple targets while waiting for the initial result. -Warning shooting. It is difficult to shoot through the bow with expensive missiles, and the speed is very slow. Even if your warning is a toast, you want the effect to be faster.

As for howitzers, you get what you pay for. – 3 rounds per minute is unacceptable unless you plan to use a group of ships for gunfire support. – The 120mm mortar turret will have more impact on the target, although the range will be reduced. – 57mm or 76mm rapid-fire guns will fire a large number of bullets at a target within a fairly good range, but they are not very useful for more difficult targets. – In your budget space, weight, and crew, a box of missiles may be your best choice; although you won't have many shots, it will knock down point targets and possibly even movers. -If you are not willing to budget enough cash for a good turret or missile, then you will not provide artillery support, so the cheap howitzer is not important.

According to my choice, I will place a 30mm on each side of the front superstructure and a 57mm behind the mast to cover the entire rear arc and most of the port and starboard tanks. The missile/etc. will move forward on the bridge.

When I asked about putting money behind the idea, did anyone really choose your weapon idea? – Can you provide some examples of ships, they choose to use missiles instead of guns for point defense, and they honestly choose both? – I don’t think I know that any ship outside the museum uses an open stand to mount heavy artillery. -There are many smart people and a lot of money in the warship industry. If no one else is trying to sell the same idea as you, it may not be worth selling.

This is basically my personal view of the crew. As I said before, I am a hardware person, not a human factor, so I followed Shelley's analysis there and provided a backup plan in case we need more staff.

Now, continuing to discuss the gun rack, you greatly exaggerated its benefits.

– Due to scattering, the gun will not even always hit static targets at greater distances. Consider the mobility and the fact that you usually need multiple automatic cannons to destroy the target, and you cannot reliably complete the kill without firing a large number of shells and destroying the magazine capacity.

– As you pointed out, radar does have its benefits, but adding it to the already expensive RWS may give you a price tag of $5 million per frame, because you are looking at a system like Phalanx. In addition, the Javelin does have a remarkable ability to shoot in bad weather, and Spike NLOS is even better because it is a post-launch locking system, so this is a difference in degree rather than ability. In addition, talking about radar brings up electronic warfare issues and adds additional loopholes and restrictions there.

– You do have a good view of crew and automation, but you forgot to weigh. These guns add more upper weight and at least $1 million per piece, so reducing to two mounts according to your recommendations will cost 75% of the side firepower and at least another $2 million (if you want radar , It is 10 dollars) the weight of the upper part. The numbers above just don't add up. One thing that is likely to fill this niche is a long-range javelin turntable with a large number of off-the-shelf missiles, but this requires a lot of development because new missile software needs to be developed and will force the addition of at least one smaller RWS Browning so The cost of the ship will still rise.

– I have never heard of using a gun to switch targets like you described, but it is at least reasonable. In other words, my intuition is that it will add a considerable amount of cost and complexity to obtain relatively modest benefits, because traversal and aiming still take time. My intuition is that this will increase the number of kills per minute by about 50%, but even if it doubles, the result is still half the damage currently set.

– Warning shooting is the job of a howitzer, I think there is no doubt that 105mm shells can attract people's attention better than automatic cannons or 57mm shells.

– The initial rate of fire of the howitzer is much higher, which may be acceptable for small warring distributed forces used in conjunction with Spike NLOS. Of course, as you pointed out, we can always choose to assemble ships, and our long voyage can easily and quickly pull ships from other stations/missions, so I don’t worry about our ability to concentrate firepower when needed.

-Reducing the range is always a problem for ships, and I suspect that mortars are also more expensive to install. In the final analysis, this is just a bad game for this ship. If you really want it on the water, a small USV would be a better choice, although I think the rocket launcher would be a better choice, emptying the magazines in one salvo to offset the vulnerability of the drone.

– This is an accurate assessment of these guns, they look worse when you remember that they do compete with the more powerful Spike NLOS batteries. When you add their reduced range, huge price tag, deck penetration and weight, they really can't fight this hybrid weapon very well.

– It sounds like you agree to install 36 Spike NLOS missiles.

– It sounds like you have forgotten the Spike NLOS missile here. Remember that this weapon kit is designed to operate as a whole, with different parts complementing each other and covering weaknesses, so you need to keep these interactions in mind.

Continue to discuss your layout. From the perspective of ship stability, I think it is unrealistic to install as high as 57 mm. It must travel on the bow like a howitzer and complicate things under the deck, but I will ignore the internal configuration and be generous. Now, this does make up for some of the missing javelin firepower, especially if we add other toys to the gun you describe, but even if we assume this is a kind of cleaning, the overall comparison does not look good. You add about 16 million dollars to the price of this ship, basically sacrificing all naval artillery capabilities, all you get is a moderate enhancement for small ships within 4-8 kilometers and a moderate improvement for small ships. Very bad ship.

Regarding money, I am reluctant to talk about it because it is usually at least competitively sensitive information, but I have seen some discussions about bringing Javelin and Spike NLOS online.

– Assuming you are talking about surface threats, the Israeli missile-armed typhoon RWS has been successful. The typhoon RWS carries various Spike family missiles.

– It is possible, but it does not mean that this is a bad idea. Remember, the Gatling gun had been dead for decades before GE resurrected it with the Vulcan cannon because it met their needs. The open installation satisfies the need for affordable naval gunfire support, so we bring it back because it is the right choice for this application.

-Actually, I am not surprised that no one else does this. These small missiles have only recently been proven enough to go to sea, and the key driving factor of this layout-the javelin needle seat is brand new. I personally participated in its development, and its first public appearance was when I released an early version of the weapon concept less than a year ago.

This is the best analysis of miniature warriors I have ever seen. I am grateful for the efforts made for this. I have several concerns.

It is difficult for me to assume that integration into commercial traffic will provide effective defense. First, there are good reasons to believe that potential enemies will specifically target merchant ships. Obviously, there is sufficient evidence that this happened in World War I and World War II, but even today, there are still a large number of operations involving national security in the commercial field. Illegal fishing, mining of minerals, new Arctic waterways and violations of sanctions have all made merchant ships the focus of attention, and there is every reason to believe that they will be the target of future conflicts. Even if this ship can be integrated into commercial traffic, are they willing?

If we still think that it is worthwhile to integrate into commercial traffic, it will not be easy to do. Between the availability of automatic identification systems (AIS), satellite imagery, maritime militia, long-range drones, and satellite communications that almost all merchant ships have, potential adversaries have many tools to determine which merchant ships are "theirs" and which are not. Even if they are at sea. Once the ship enters the port to refuel, the lid will be exploded. Its photos will appear on social media immediately.

This brings me to another major issue, and that is cost. The average USCG Sentinel class is about US$65 million per ship. This applies to ships that have begun to adopt a mother body design, mass-produced, and basically have no combat system. The proposed ship will adopt a new design, approximately twice the size of the Sentry class, rely on advanced autonomous technology, and have an unprecedented propulsion system (a fairly certain IPS/waterjet/7500 nautical mile range/30 knots maximum speed has never been reached ) Complete), combining invisible styling and a small well deck. Plus the combat system and various weapons. In addition, this ship will depend on the cost of the ship obtaining the target information. It looks like you will soon break the $100 million barrier. If you agree with my view that integrating into commercial traffic is not feasible, then the cost will rise sharply. You must either attach great importance to stealth capabilities or invest in a more powerful self-defense radar.

I think your weapon loading is promising, but I am as worried about howitzers as everyone else. I agree with a previous commenter’s suggestion that the Patria NEMO turret would be a good choice, but I understand your desire not to use a turret. I recommend using CARDOM base as an alternative to NEMO. It is in service on the Army’s Stryker and has fire control and recoil mitigation. It weighs only about 2500 pounds and does not require penetration on deck. It does not match the range of the howitzer, but it looks like you have many other options for those with missile kits.

Thanks, I am glad you like it.

Before I delve into your tactical issues, I want to remind you that this is a topic that will soon be categorized, so there are serious limitations to what can be discussed here.

Having said that, it is important to remember the missile count problem. LMACC is quite small and looks even smaller with signature reduction, so it will be integrated with small fishing vessels, rather than cargo ships that were the main interception focus during the World War. Of course, as you pointed out, fishing is a major issue in the South China Sea, so intercept attempts are possible, but the number of people relying on fishing for a living means that the number of small fishing boats will continue to exist and will continue to exist. This makes it impossible for the Chinese to sink all these ships with missiles, especially those farther from the mainland, and will force them to approach the gun range to intercept and sink these ships. Needless to say, if they try to do this on one of our boats, they will feel very unpleasant, especially because it is very likely that we will passively discover that they are hunting a real fishing boat before they know we are there.

In addition, due to our large electronic warfare kit and maneuverability, we do have other options, especially in terms of survivability, because the electronic warfare system is designed to protect ships larger than this.

On the hostile ISR front, I personally suspect that once the shooting begins, anyone’s satellite will continue to operate for a long time. Between anti-satellite weapons and Kessler’s syndrome, orbit will be a very dangerous place in modern warfare. In terms of aircraft, drones like MPA are easy to deal with for Falcon variants, so we have a reliable answer to this threat. As you pointed out, social media is also a major issue, but the ship’s range means that we should be able to dock in locations that the enemy cannot easily monitor during wartime to reduce this risk.

Going on to talk about costs, I know where you are from, but many of these worries are really no big deal. For example, the increase in the range and displacement of the outpost mainly requires a larger fuel tank, which is just cheap welded steel, and 30 knots on the waterjet is easy. The only propulsion interface that may cause any new wrinkles is the use of an electric motor with a water jet, but I don’t think there will be any problems there, because the electric motor does not transmit vibration to the jet like traditional propulsion, so any unexpected results will be The appearance is more likely to be positive. Similarly, stealth molding is mainly caused by angle steel rather than advanced materials, so any problems should be limited to minor inconveniences with minimal impact on costs. Now, this is not to say that nothing will increase funding, because improved launch facilities, electronic equipment and weapons will definitely bring considerable revenue, but I believe it will remain below $100 million because missiles and drones come from Different fields of money.

The one thing you brought up that I want to study in depth is the concept of parent design. It often appears these days and is usually regarded as a magical cost reduction button, but it is not the case. If you stick to the original design, it can reduce the cost and time required to complete the design and testing phases, but any design changes will become complicated because the original engineers never planned for them, so major changes will weaken these advantages. Once you enter In the production stage, the parent design will only hurt you. Different yards are conducive to different construction methods, so you may pay the price for the parent design not optimized for your yard, and the engineering complexity I mentioned before usually translates into expensive design workarounds, because the most Good design is not feasible. I don't know enough about the Sentinel class to explain how it is affected by this, so it may not make sense in this case, but this is certainly not a blow to the LMACC Hull 2.

To be fair, there is a case where the parent design can save a lot of money, and that is when you make a one-time or limited run variant of a used course, because it simplifies the logistics. This is obviously not the case here, but if the Navy is going to carry out some special mission San Antonio modification (choose your taste, there are many ideas to run around) the additional cost of building this ship will far outweigh the reduction in operating costs through logistics and training versatility. .

In the end, your suggestion to consider using Cardom mortar is very interesting, but as you pointed out, scope is an issue. Yes, missiles can certainly be shot farther, so we can still fight at greater distances, but they cannot provide area bombing like guns (or mortars). In addition, although it does solve some of the problems of other turrets, it is still more costly than howitzers and requires more maintenance, so the simple choice is best for this application.

The U.S. Navy has recently had good luck with the parent design, but bad luck on the clean sheets.

EPF is largely based on a high-speed ship built by Austal. EPF is not perfect, but it seems to fit its role well, and the Navy seems to like it very much. Its cost is approximately US$200 million.

Both ESB and ESD are based on Alaska-class tankers. Again, these two levels are not perfect, but the Navy seems to be very satisfied with them, and they are looking for new roles for these ships. They cost approximately US$550 million.

As mentioned earlier, the USCG quick response cutting machine is based on the parent design and performs well in the USCG service. Their cost is approximately $65 million.

Compare DDG-1000 and LCS. Both programs are basically clean designs (although I think LCS has some foundations). I happen to think that these two ships have many advantages, but many people in the Navy disagree with me. There are some tribal watch designs that seem to go well-LPD and Sea Hutner-but I think there is something to say about the parent design.

Examples absolutely cannot prove anything, especially since it is basically impossible to directly compare these platforms with equivalent brand new designs.

In other words, the Liberty-class LCS is derived from the motor yacht Destriero, and the independent-class LCS is derived from the high-speed ferry HSC Benchijigua Express. You might say that the Nimitz is qualified as the parent design of this ship. Ford must therefore have clear examples of parent design problems.

Obviously, this article was not written by me, but it is a topic I am interested in.

I agree with your concerns about howitzers, but I am not sure whether the proposed ship can be fitted with MK 110 57 mm. Their weight is 8 times that of howitzers, and more importantly, they require a lot of penetration on the deck. The smaller vessel has 57mm installed, but it may not be worth it when you consider all the things this hull has to do (good deck, stealth function, storage of a lot of fuel). After all, the first task of this ship seems to be to launch LRASM.

A single MK 46 installation is easier to manage, but their size is very similar to the 120mm patria system you mentioned, in this case I might prefer 120mm mortars, but they can all be expensive. MK 46 more than 10 million U.S. dollars

To answer your missile and gun point defense questions, the first examples that come to mind are SeaRAM and gun-based CWIS. There are many examples of the U.S. Navy choosing the former.

First of all, LRASM is the top priority of this ship, so you are very profitable. Everything else is secondary, the purpose is to make it bear LRASM or provide low-cost utility. Please keep in mind that previous designs on this topic tend to look more like the minimum requirements I listed, and still cost about 90 million dollars, so you can clearly see that we spend very little money to get all this practical program.

This is why I tried so hard to oppose the more expensive installation suggested. In many cases, their added costs are higher than the combined costs of all existing flexibility, but the benefits are relatively small, and they often bring other serious shortcomings.

In addition, you can also install penetrating deck guns like 57 mm. There is not much available space under the deck, and the cabins along the length of the ship complicate the situation. Rearranging the ship to fit it will almost certainly require sacrificing the built-in survivability provided by the current configuration, and will further complicate some potential problems in the internal layout. Considering the weight, cost, and elimination of naval artillery support capabilities, trade makes no sense.

Finally, I agree with your point of view on missile-based point defense. Now, SeaRAM seems to be replacing Phalanx in an all-round way. Simple RAM boxes have been defensively for decades. Coupled with foreign designs such as Russia's Kashtan and Pantsir systems, missile point defense seems to be the way forward.

I really don't use IPS on the waterjet, especially for such a small platform. This and stealth will increase costs. The unmanned MUSV will be smaller than this ship, less concealed, and has a simple propulsion system. Before adding any mission equipment, its price was 308,000-35 million. That is a platform that is less than 500 tons and less than 50m. Even if you make a deal, the ship will at least spend in the field of fast-response cutting machines before adding equipment. Let you rest, put it on the cyclone class hull, it will add up quickly. Just a quick low ball.

Searam 11.12 SEWIP Blk II Lite 5.158 MK 53 Decoy Launcher System (DLS) (Nulka)- 4 Launcher 1.214 istalker saw gimbal 0.515 7m rib 0.185 Cyclone (2020$) 46.64 Lack of a lot of equipment 3.24 Total:

Since Brian Adornato and I covered IPS below, I will focus on the rest here.

The waterjet was chosen for coastal flexibility, not speed or efficiency. Air intake filters can block big things. They are more resistant to environmental damage than traditional screws. Therefore, we can withstand the risks of larger underwater obstacles and operate more freely in shallow and messy waters. In addition, because they are steerable and reversible, they provide us with unparalleled agility and allow us to do things such as driving sideways in the water, which is very useful for entering harsh ports without the support of a tugboat.

For stealth, you think too much about B-2 or Zumwalt. Our advantage is that it is close to the size of a fishing boat, so we don't need to do anything too extreme to get RCS to where we want. A simple angle steel reflects a large amount of energy from the transmitter and hardly increases the cost of the ship. The only real cost you can describe as stealth is an enclosed mast, but it also makes maintenance easier, so it's easy to justify it.

In terms of cost, I don't really want to delve into these numbers, but we seem to be on the same page. Some of your estimates seem to point more or less to my $96.6 million figure, and given the inherent uncertainty of the estimate, this is in line with what the figure will reach. Also, keep in mind that we are essentially comparing it with other things that the Navy can buy, and there is no doubt that LMACC will even be much cheaper than FFG(X).

In terms of cost, I think FFG(x) may not be the best comparison of cost. The tasks of FFG(x) are very different from the tasks you planned for LMACC.

I think the better comparison is LCS and EPF. Each LCS is about 550 million U.S. dollars, and EPF is about 200 million U.S. dollars. If LMACC reaches $300 million (especially if it cannot reach its range target), then in my opinion, the decision between LMACC and LCS will be a difficult one. EPF is another interesting comparison. Obviously, this ship is unarmed, but it also has 600 tons to play and a large open deck. If you can find a way to bind LRASM and use this cargo space as fuel, you can recreate some LMACC functions. You can't get the 7500 NM range from EPF, but armed EPF and LMACC are an interesting comparison.

Thank you for doing so well in highlighting the cost-effectiveness of LMACC. You have to triple the project cost estimate, ignoring key performance characteristics, to reduce it to a level where other candidates can even start competing. This strongly proves that our design is a huge leap forward and will be an excellent purchase for the Navy.

As for FFG(X), I pointed out that because it is the cheapest surface warship currently purchased by the Navy, the failure to purchase LMACC means that FFG(X) will have to be pressed into the expected role of LMACC.

This article was not written by me, but I agree with the author about the use of IPS on this ship.

IPS allows you to run propulsion systems and "house loads" (combat systems, lights, kitchen equipment, etc.) on a very well-designed heavy-duty engine. This is essential to maximize efficiency at cruising speed. IPS can also help you as quickly as possible. If you really need to drive fast, then you can reduce some of the house load and transfer that power to propulsion.

I agree with your assessment that this may increase costs (although eliminating the main reduction gear is a saving). At the same time, on a relatively small vessel, a maximum speed of 30 knots and a range of 7,500 nautical miles will be difficult to achieve. You will need all the advantages you can get.

Another underestimated advantage of IPS is that we can use the battery to jump the thruster directly to full power while the engine catches up to move faster. At first glance, this may not seem particularly important, but when a missile strikes you and interference is your main defense, every foot you can place between yourself and the missile’s flight path increases the chance of successfully evading the attack.

In addition, the flip side of being able to cut systems at faster speeds is that if the price drops enough to install them here in the future, it allows you to trade speed for the speed of power-consuming systems such as lasers and railguns.

In terms of performance, the speed of 30 knots is quite moderate. Most warships in this size range have a speed of at least 40 knots, and I expect our total engine/electric installed weight to be similar to that of the smaller Tornado. This leaves a lot of extra displacement for more fuel and food, so I believe we can achieve this performance goal. Also, I treat displacement as output, not input, so if our hull work shows that we need to grow a bit more, this is what we will do.

The new fleet proposal calls for a ship similar to the one proposed in this article. It will be interesting to see how the Navy develops in this area.

Here are interesting ideas about competing platforms. Another potential hull design that may have significant speed and range is being carried out by Boundary Layer Technology in California. They are looking for a hydrofoil cargo ship for trans-Pacific routes. I believe this design utilizes water jets and retractable foils. This will meet the strict port considerations listed in con ops.

A big fan of water jets, but they do have problems. There is a significant ship handling gap in the SWO community, and the LCS program is addressing this issue. In addition, due to long-term shelving, fuel considerations, and moody high-speed diesel engines (I will exclude GT because they are not specified for this design). In short, I don't like sitting with water spray. They should be operated at least once a week. It is hoped that the smaller expected size of this design will result in lower fuel consumption and higher utilization.

On the topic of high-speed diesel engines. It is best to remove the impeller shaft from the generator. This can completely eliminate the need for fussy high-speed diesel. Although, as far as I know, no large water jet boat can use such a power system. The new powertrain design is the main reason for the propulsion problems of 1 variant.

One last thought, someone mentioned that bevel steel plates can be used to reduce RCS. But at what weight is the penalty? If you plan to have a smaller ship with a higher speed equipped with water jets, each additional ounce of weight will reduce the top speed and increase the possibility of cavitation and thrust breakdown. Eliminates the biggest advantage of the water jet, the thrust vector. This is another problem with the two LCS variants.

I am very pleased to discuss in depth the handling and operating precautions of water jet boats.

Thanks for your wonderful comments. You have a lot of points here, so I will go through them in order.

Hydrofoil: This sounds like an interesting hull and might be worth exploring, but I have some concerns that make me tend to stay away from it, at least initially. The most important thing is the risk, because we want to put these equipment into use as soon as possible, and the problem of the hydrofoil system may cause all problems. I was also worried about its impact on maintenance, draft, weight, and stealth, but these were ultimately obscured by technical risks.

Ship handling: Our main plan is to allocate most of the ship handling tasks to computers to reduce the workload of the crew, but in the final analysis, a well-trained crew cannot be replaced. Fortunately, we can take advantage of the work of the LCS program here. One benefit of automatic general navigation is that the crew has more time to train for challenging situations, so I don’t think there are any insurmountable problems here, especially considering To the extraordinary agility compared to our other warships. Obviously, this requires a diligent team of experts to solve the details, just like any other new ship class introduction, so this is mainly to find the right person for the job.

Maintenance: I have planned to run the water jet through the generator. As you pointed out, there are many problems related to high-speed diesel engines and gearboxes, which eliminates the problems of reducing maintenance and improving usability, because I want them to be rugged, low-end workhorses. The downside is obviously that it takes some extra upfront work to make everything work properly, but our smaller scale makes the supplier accustomed to electric ferries more familiar with problems and adjustment problems will inevitably occur on any vessel, so I suspect This will be a deal breaker. The bigger concern is whether the Navy can avoid the problem of grounding jets. Although my intention is to make these ships work hard so that we can provide the overworked Burks with the maintenance they need, there is no Ways to know what will happen.

Steel used to reduce RCS: To clarify, any metal will reflect radar energy, so if the angle is correct, the RCS will be reduced. From a physical point of view, radar energy is the same as visible light, so as long as it is smooth compared to the wavelength, a flat metal plate will reflect it like a mirror. If you want to learn more about reducing RCS, you can find unclassified detailed information on the Internet through a quick search, and take the shape of the Visby-class frigate as an example. For LMACC, I plan to use an all-steel structure to improve durability, repairability, and fire resistance, because the relatively moderate speed of 30 knots makes the extra weight acceptable, so in this case, it will be steel reflection radar energy. Reduce RCS. It is not as good as a composite material that contains a special layer optimized for the job, but it still helps a lot and basically has no cost because it is only an adjustment of the plate welding angle.

Finally, I am interested in other insights on ship handling and operational considerations. My background is in technology rather than operations, so it would be useful to learn more about this topic.

Ben, is there a better way to reach you?

Please use my official NPS email address and include Dr. Shelley Gallup as he is the leader. Our address is:

benjamin.didonato@nps.edu spgallup@nps.edu

Regarding the "light load" naval vessels:

I have served on the best manned/small crew navy and coast guard vessels (including patrol boats); and on the merchant ships on my license. The main reason why it is difficult for warships to replicate civilian "small crews" is that from the moment they board the ship, they must be fully qualified for the work they are doing. In contrast, in a naval department of 10 sailors, only one (usually the chief) is fully trained/qualified/experienced and qualified for the job they perform. Each naval vessel is designed as a training platform for most sailors. Each sailor is assigned a large number of qualifications, and they hope to learn on the job during their travels. In addition, a significant portion of the working day is spent training sailors to become leaders, adults, or better to work in the Navy. Related to this is the high management burden in terms of evaluation, rewards, recognition, promotion, discipline, and qualifications. Warships also have more and more complex/fine electronic and communication equipment, including cryptographic materials, continuous satellite-based command and control, and security space; warships must be equipped with defensive and offensive weapon stations.

Carrying a cargo ship from Port A to Port B for single-speed large-circle transportation is completely different from conducting a tortuous coastal warfare.

On civilian ships, this is not the case; therefore, a much smaller crew is possible. Automated line processing, navigation, engineering, and weapons observatories are just a small part of the puzzle. As long as the Navy adheres to the "every ship is a training platform" mentality, for every 10 crew members, you may only get one or two "full speed" sailors. In addition to being unable to complete their work without assistance, the other eight people also need to provide a large amount of additional human capital in the form of continuous training, guidance and supervision.

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